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ABSTRACT

THE RHETORIC OF VIOLENCE

James C. Gunter
Department of English
Master of Arts

This thesis seeks to understand how we read and understand the use of depictions
of violence by examining its rhetorical presentation. Although the media gives us a mixed
understanding of the way that experiencing violence secondarily (that is, through all
types of media) affects us, scholarship in this area has proved clear connections between
viewing/experiencing depictions of violence and raised levels of aggression. On the other
hand, there is a clear difference between gratuitous depictions of violence and socially
useful depictions of violence (i.e., the difference between a slasher movie and a holocaust
movie) that that area of scholarship does not expressly take into account. I argue that the
language of trauma studies has the ability to evaluate the impact of violent texts on
audiences and that Kenneth Burke’s Dramatistic Pentad has the ability the examine
depictions of violence to uncover explicit and hidden ideologies that affect the
presentation of the violence and, thus, our reception and interpretation of that violence.
Working in conjunction, these two theories can help audience’s understand depictions of
violence on an ideological level and help them to assess the violence’s potential traumatic
impact on themselves and others within certain contexts. To demonstrate this theory of
understanding violence, I make two short analyses of Native Son and The Lovely Bones

and demonstrate an in-depth analysis of Fight Club and Blood Meridian in order to give
an example of the type of reading I am advocating and its potential for understanding and
interpreting depictions of violence in ways that uncover both social benefit and harm. In
the end, I hope that this theory of reading violence might extend beyond the sample
readings I have done and into other types of media, so that we can all understand the
ways that violence is used rhetorically for social and political purposes and be able to
both use it and interpret it responsibly.
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CHAPTER 1: FICTION AND RHETORIC, VIOLENCE AND TRAUMA
In January 2006, Larry H. Miller, a Salt Lake City businessman who owns
multiple car dealerships and movie theatres, decided to pull Brokeback Mountain from
his theaters just hours before it was scheduled to open. Despite his assertion that he is not
a “community censor,” his official reason for pulling the movie was his fear that the
homosexual love affair between two cowboys was a “dangerous” attack on the traditional
family (“Miller Explains” B.02). However, also opening that weekend in Salt Lake City,
and in Miller’s own theaters, was the slasher movie Hostel. Hostel follows a pair of
American backpackers in Europe who hear about a hostel packed with beautiful women
who want to have illicit sex with American tourists. After they arrive at the hostel and
have their expected sexual encounters, they learn that the hostel’s real purpose is to lure
in victims for rich people who want to live their dark fantasies of torture and murder.
Cinemareview.com, a website that posts detailed explanations of movie content, lists
Hostel’s violent content:
Very bloody, very extreme: toes are cut off; holes are drilled into a man; a
man’s ankles are sliced; a man’s fingers are cut off; throat slashings; a
man’s leg is sliced with a chainsaw; a woman gets a blowtorch to the face;
a dangling eyeball is cut off; a woman throws herself in front of a moving
train and is run over on the tracks; men are hit with rocks and pipes;
glimpses of severed heads, fingers, and various limbs; bloody scenes of
surgery; bloody shootings, including ones to the head; drowning in a
toilet. (Cinemareview.com)
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One can only wonder about Miller’s rationale when a movie that depicts a loving
relationship between two men is more dangerous than a movie whose sole purpose is to
shock and titillate through extreme, bloody violence—not to mention strong heterosexual
sexual content (so much so, in fact, that New York Magazine movie critic David
Edelstein labels it “Torture Porn” [par. 1]). Whereas the link between viewing
homosexual depictions and having homosexual tendencies is controversial at best, the
link between viewing violence and increased aggression has been well established by
multiple studies and has been consistent over many years (Anderson et al., Bushman and
Anderson). However, the mainstream media has been lax in reporting the conclusions of
the overwhelming majority of researchers in the field, mainly because of the media’s
vested financial interest in violent media and their sense of “journalistic fairness”
(Bushman and Anderson 486-87). As a result, the public receives the diluted message
that violent narratives may or may not have an adverse effect on their own aggression and
their own views on violence in the real world.
But this thesis is not about trying to find the link between depictions of violence
and physical aggression, nor is it about attacking mainstream media. This thesis is about
creating a system whereby we can examine violence in fiction through the context of
ideology and its rhetorical effect on readers, so as to determine the way violence
functions as a rhetorical device. Understanding the rhetoric of violence through the
ideological context is important because, although Anderson et al. acknowledge the fact
that researching the effects of violence in media often relies on varied and broad
definitions and measurements of violence (82-83), studies linking violence and
manifestations of physical aggression fail take into account the ideological perspective
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that the violence illustrates—at least not to the degree with which I am going to explore
it. For example, Anderson et al., while summarizing the breadth of research linking
media violence and aggression, never go into more detail than to use the term “violent
media” or “violent scenes,” (84-88) demonstrating that, within the research, there is no
real distinction between a movie like Hostel, or the Saw movies, and anti-war films such
as Apocalypse Now or Full Metal Jacket. Granted, all these movies are violent, but their
rhetorical stance toward the violence they depict varies greatly.
The Mirror Fallacy
Those who control media content have, in large part, defended violent films and
TV by saying that they are only reflecting reality, claiming that much of the violent
content has a socially responsible base and message. And although the validity of this
belief has been questioned and examined by multiple scholars and theorists in academic
circles (specifically, many of the postmodern critics) I would argue that it is still a
argument that has much power in the popular media and, as such, still has an effect on the
type and themes of media that are produced and mass consumed1. However, M.H.
Abrams, while laying out a solid history of the shifting views of the definition of art
throughout history in The Mirror and the Lamp, posits questions about the validity of the
mirror metaphor—the idea that art is a reflection of reality. In his reevaluation of the
history of artistic criticism, he points out that there are certain “archetypal analogies,”
like the art-mirror metaphor, that categorize and systematize certain ideas in a way that
gives structure to abstract concepts (31). The metaphor originally comes from Plato, but
1

Bushman and Anderson (479-80) give multiple examples of TV and film executives
doubting the findings of research that demonstrates a clear connection between portrayals
of violence and increased aggression, and almost all of them evoke the mirror analogy to
defend the violent media they produce.
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Abrams questions its accuracy asking, “To what extent may the concept have been
generated from the analogy?” (31). In essence, he is representing a viewpoint that
questions whether the generally accepted concept of art as mirror has been generated
from the metaphor itself, rather than from the actual nature of art. And although the
mirror is a popular metaphor to conceptualize art, the metaphor leaves out certain
qualities of art that the mirror does not explain or account for. For example, Abrams
points out that “the very sharpness of focus afforded by a happily chosen archetype
makes marginal and elusive those qualities of an object which fall outside its primitive
categories” (35). This is to say that in some respects, art is like a mirror, but it is not like a
mirror in all respects; therefore, the metaphor may not always be an accurate analogy for
art. For example, the mirror metaphor does not take into account the creative aspect of
art, the fact that art is a construction, or interpretation, through a human medium that is
not perfectly reflective or clear. In fact, thinking about art as a constructive process rather
than a reflective process, increases the artist’s moral responsibility to society, instead of
minimizing it (Vatz 158). The general idea that art is reflective rather than constructive,
then, might be more attractive to those who purvey violent media precisely because it
relieves them of responsibility for the effects that the audience may experience or suffer
from viewing, reading, or listening to such content.
In addition, what these executives and artists do not take into account, when they
insist that they are not responsible for their depictions of violence, is the rather pragmatic
fact that they work in fiction. So despite how much they may be influenced by the real
world, they are the creators—the constructors—of artifice. In more modern terms than
those set up by Plato, Aristotle, and Abrams, Baudrillard, in his comments on the
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successive phases of the image, dismisses the whole idea that anything man-made can
actually reflect the real world, that—even if at one time it was meant to—any new
creations are just simulacra of simulacra (3-7). But, I use Baudrillard sparingly. For,
seemingly, if all art is just simulacra, then authors of fiction have no responsibility for the
interpretations of their violent portrayals. However, authors (as will be shown in more
detail later) manipulate their works—including the use of violent story elements—in an
attempt to bring about certain reactions and arouse feelings in the reader or audience.
That is, authors purposefully use stories, words, plot elements, characters, and all other
dramatic or comedic devices to affect the reader, and as a result, although their work may
not be a refection of reality, it can still affect the reader or audience in very real ways that
are both intentional and unintentional. Thus, knowing that a creation is purposefully
fictitious should immediately raise questions about the validity or truthfulness of that
work because fiction ultimately comes from the imaginary. So as much as creators want
to claim that their fictitious creations are real, they seem to be working under a selfcontradictory philosophy. Wayne Booth characterizes this seemingly logical fallacy well,
saying: “artifice is unmistakably present whenever the author tells us what no one in socalled real life could possibly know” (Rhetoric 3). In other words, when an author is
making things up, his work is fictitious and, therefore, cannot be a perfect mirror to any
reality. As a result, in popular media, defending violent content simply on the grounds
that it is a reflection of reality is an impotent argument.
The Rhetoric of Fiction
The problem with fiction is that it is always partial, biased, and most definitely
persuasive. As Booth points out, “In practice, no author ever manages to create a work
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which shows complete impartiality” (Rhetoric 78). But biased work is not necessarily the
conscious fault of the author; it is a result of the constraints of fiction itself. Borges
makes an analogy for this constraint in “Del Rigor en la Ciencia” (“Of Exactitude in
Science”), in which an empire has perfected cartography to the point that they create a
map of the empire that is the same scale as the empire itself. But in trying to encompass
everything, the map becomes completely useless and unwieldy. Kenneth Burke expresses
this same idea with his idea of language as a “terministic screen.” He explains that
because language cannot encompass the totality of any object or idea, language is “a
selection of reality; and to this extent it must function as a deflection of reality”
(“Terministic Screens” 45). Such is the same with fiction. The constraints of written
language do not allow one to say or write “everything.” And just like the Borges’ map,
even if one could write everything, the work would become so unwieldy that it would
render itself useless. In fact, language’s very utility lies in the fact that it boils down
experience and the totality of the universe into small, overly simplified chunks that we
can deal with. But in doing so it inevitably focuses attention on certain characteristics of
the world over others. And because language itself focuses attention in certain areas over
others, Booth declares that “all authors inevitably take sides,” in that if “a given work
will be ‘about’ a character or set of characters [,] it cannot possibly give emphasis to all,
regardless of what the author believes about the desirability of fairness” (Rhetoric 78).
Indeed, he goes on to say, “In centering our [the reader’s] interest, sympathy, or affection
on one character, [the author] inevitably excludes from our interest, sympathy, or
affection some other character” (79)2. So even in deciding on a set of characters, the

2

Richard Lanham also explores the idea of drawing the reader’s attention to certain ideas
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author is being impartial and biased because in choosing to tell one story, and choosing to
tell it with a chosen set of characters, he is inevitably excluding all other stories and all
other characters and points of view. And although this might simply be considered the
natural selection of a story and point of view on the part of the author, it is nonetheless a
conscious exclusion of other points of view and other stories. From the outset, then,
authors are partial and biased because they have chosen to exclude the vast majority of
material and focus the reader’s attention on a specific story chosen by the author through
his or her choice of words.3
But bias runs deeper than simply choosing one story to tell over another, the
language an author uses to tell a story as well as the narrative focus of the reader’s
attention and sympathies is a form of persuasion, further complicating the idea that any
author can be impartial or simply reflect reality. For example, Kenneth Burke states that
rhetoric “is rooted in an essential function of language itself [. . .] a symbolic means of
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Rhetoric 43). In this
light, all language is a means of persuading others to cooperation, whether it be overt,
like persuading a legislative body to pass a piece of legislation, or whether it be subtle,
like giving a character heroic characteristics in order to persuade the reader that the

through emphasis. In The Economics of Attention, he argues that even though rhetoric
“has traditionally been defined as the art of persuasion [,] it might as well, though, be
called the economics of attention” (21). His idea is that persuasion is created through the
allocation of attention to selected information over other information. In this view,
rhetoric functions as a filter of information, not necessarily its originator.
3
As an interesting side note, Bushman and Anderson found that 87% of crime in reality
is non-violent, compared with 13% on reality-based TV shows like Cops (479). And
although murder accounts for only 0.2% of violent crime in the US, it accounts of 50% of
all crime on reality-based TV shows (479). So even in so-called reality TV, the
representation (“the mirror of reality”) of crime is unevenly focused on violent crime and
murder.

Gunter

8

character’s actions are heroic. Rhetoric, in this sense, is the use of language to bring
about a cooperative effect—one that brings readers into the worldview that the author
wants them to inhabit—whether the effect is intentional or not. And although attempting
to be unbiased is a virtuous quality in a writer “in so far as it warns the novelist that he
can seldom afford to pour his untransformed biases into his work” (Booth Rhetoric 70),
in reality all language is biased in that it creates rhetorical effects in the audience. And
because all language is rhetorical, all language becomes a form of persuasion, producing
effects in the audience that lead them to be persuaded to worldviews different from their
own—even in fiction. For example, in fiction, a writer’s object is to constantly
manipulate the reader’s emotions and attitudes toward the characters of a narrative in
order to bring about the rhetorical effect that he or she desires. In doing so, the writer
uses biased language and, as a result, readers to adopt a certain emotional state and
attitude toward the characters and actions in the fiction. Of course when it is the emotion
and attitude that the writer intends, the author declares the fiction “successful.” In a
romance novel, the object is to center readers’ interests in the love of two people so far as
to convince readers that these people do love each other and that they deserve to be with
one another, so the author uses impartial language to persuade the reader to that purpose.
In horror, the author uses specifically biased language to persuade readers to feel fear and
anxiety. In mysteries, authors impartially manipulate language to drop clues to readers
without seeming like they are dropping clues, all the while trying to confuse the reader
with extraneous facts, but not confuse them enough to make them frustrated to the point
that they stop reading. In reality, all fiction is a constant game of persuasion: if the author
can persuade the reader to feel the right way, the reader will continue to read. If readers

Gunter

9

fail to feel what the author intends, the reader stops reading, or—apart from the intent of
the author—if readers fail to feel the effects that they believe they should feel, they stop
reading or give the fiction a bad review. Indeed Booth states: “all of the old-fashioned
dramatic devices of pace and timing can be refurbished for the purposes of a dramatic,
impersonal narration. And manipulation of dramatized points of view can [. . .] convey
the author’s judgment with great precision” (Rhetoric 272). So not only is fictional work
biased, but that bias is a way to focus the reader’s attention on certain emotions or ideas
in an attempt to persuade the reader to some purpose, even if the result is unintentional.
But many writers may scoff at the idea that their fiction—to some extent—is
always rhetorical. At the same time, though, many writers also declare their intentions to
achieve such-and-such an effect or “move” the audience to feel certain emotional
crescendos or a cathartic release. Take, for example, Richard Wright who discusses the
reason for his stylistic choices in Native Son in his essay “How ‘Bigger’ was Born”:
I had written a book of short stories which was published under the title of
Uncle Tom’s Children. When the reviews of that book began to appear, I
realized that I had made an awfully naïve mistake. I found that I had
written a book which even bankers’ daughters could read and weep over
and feel good about. I swore to myself that if I ever wrote another book,
no one would weep over it; that it would be so hard and deep that they
would have to face it without the consolation of tears. (“Bigger” 454)
Wright realized that the style he had used in his earlier work situated the fiction’s
interests, sympathies, and affections such that people whom he did not intend to be his
audience (i.e., bankers’ daughters) could identify with the characters and situations that
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he was portraying. Thus in Native Son, the work that grew out of this realization, Wright
consciously tried to change the way that his language portrayed Bigger and his situation,
in order to bring about a rhetorical effect on the audience that was not sympathetic, but
rather “hard and deep” so that those bankers’ daughters couldn’t feel as if they
understood the black man, his situation, or his plight. Instead, he intended to use “terms
which would, in the course of the story, manipulate the deepest held notions and
convictions of their lives” (454). This conscious and specific use of language to achieve
certain effects in the reader is an example of the way that writers use rhetoric to persuade
readers to a certain point of view that the writer holds. In Wright’s case, we can see that
not only does the author have a conscious objective in mind for his fiction, but he is also
fully aware of the way that fiction can act persuasively to achieve certain effects and
purposes.
As another example, Flannery O’Connor, widely known for using violence in her
fiction, is similar to Wright, in that she makes the conscious choice to use a certain plot
element intended to illicit a very specific response from the reader. Writing about her use
of violence she says, “In my own stories I have found that violence is strangely capable
of returning my characters to reality and preparing them to accept their moment of grace”
(O’Connor 112). With her use of violence, then, O’Connor consciously attempts to shock
her characters into specific realizations; however, she is also trying to affect the reader in
specific ways. Acknowledging that some have called “A Good Man is Hard to Find”
“grotesque,” she writes, “In this story you should be on the lookout for such things as the
action of grace in the grandmother’s soul, not for the dead bodies” (113). But no matter
what O’Connor thinks readers should focus on, the violent acts, in this case, are where
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many readers place their focus, despite her best intentions. But apart from her thoughts on
this particular story, O’Connor also expressed a belief that the audience should be
affected by the violence portrayed in her fiction; she writes:
The novelist with Christian concerns will find in modern life distortions
which are repugnant to him, and his problem will be to make these appear
as distortions to an audience which is used to seeing them as natural; and
he may be forced to take ever more violent means to get his vision across
to this hostile audience. [. . .] you have to make your vision apparent by
shock—to the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind you
draw large startling figures. (33-34)4
However, although O’Connor realizes that she is consciously trying to affect the reader in
some way, she also acknowledges that ultimately she may have little control over the
reader. She writes, “To some extent, the writer can choose his subject, [. . .] but he can
never choose what he is able to make live” (qtd. in Katz 56). So although O’Connor is
similar to Wright in that she consciously intends to persuade her audience to certain
points of view, she also acknowledges that the writer does not necessarily control the
effect that his or her fiction has on readers.
Brian Evenson, as well, is an author who does not deny that he has a certain
rhetorical purposes in mind for his fiction and his audience. Brian Evenson is the author
of Altmann’s Tongue, whose short-story subjects range from simple murder, to animal
mutilation, incest, and serial killers—all portrayed in stark, gruesome detail. In the
4

O’Connor’s idea of using violence as a way to shout at the reader is an illustration of
Lanham’s concept of allocating attention to certain ideas/elements in order to draw
attention to them, thus rhetorically emphasizing what the author wants to convey. (See
footnote 2).
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afterword to Altmann’s Tongue, Evenson explains that he wants to use violence “not as
symbolic, not as meaningful, but as a basic an irrecoverable act—using violence that
overflows boundaries of expectation, violence as a kind of deterritorialization that floods
society and leaves it drowning underwater” (271). Even in this statement, Evenson
recognizes the rhetorical quality of his narratives. He even assigns actions to the theme of
violence, which shows a clear desire to make the narrative affect something outside the
text itself—to take on a rhetorical effect. Further, Evenson elaborates on exactly what
effect he wants to create in the reader:
I wanted to move the reader away from seeing something mimetically
depicted, toward feeling (and perhaps resenting) that they are being drawn
into the artistic object, into the transgressions therein. [. . .] I wanted to
draw the reader into the sensation of having the gun snouting against his
or her own fragile temple, to draw the reader into a situation in which
sensation outweighs mimesis. (272)
Unequivocally, Evenson intends to do violence to the reader, to affect the reader in a
manner akin to personal trauma, and he does it much more explicitly than either Wright
or O’Connor.
All these authors desire to alienate, shock, or put a gun to the head of the reader—
to affect them through the text in some way. Although O’Connor wants readers to focus
on grace for purposes of Christian enlightenment, Evenson’s reasons for wanting to
traumatize the reader are a little less clear. When explaining why he wants to use his
fiction like a gun to the reader’s head, he explains, “Violence, movement, ontology, and
epistemology deflect off one another and off other ideas and notions in a way that I hope
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will continue to shimmer and shift after the experience of reading the book is over” (278).
So although Evenson is very direct about his desire to affect the audience in some violent
manner, his reasons for doing so are cloudy at best. Using such general terms, and laying
out such a vague goal for inflicting violence on the reader makes one question Evenson’s
actual motivations, leading one to wonder if there really is a purpose to his violence or if
he is simply trying to justify his own fascination with stark, bloody violence in a
academically acceptable way. However, despite any author’s reasons for doing so, fiction
has an affect on the audience. Whether that effect is intentional on the part of the author
or not, the stories we tell have an effect us. But despite the fact that an author can
effectively use language to get the audience to feel what he or she wants them to feel,
their success in doing so depends a great deal on the person reading. Certainly, as Roland
Barthes points out, “Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader,” making
“the writer the only person in literature” (148). And so much talk of what the author
intends and desires seems to work against the fact that, as O’Connor points out, the writer
cannot choose what he or she is able to “make live” in the mind of the reader. And
Barthes, in declaring the “Death of the Author,” states that “a text’s utility lies not in its
origin, but in its destination” (148). But as much as it might be easy to blame readers for
their own violent impulses after reading and interpreting a violent piece of fiction,
authors participate in the creation and interpretation of their own texts to varying degrees.
It is for this reason I have called this thesis “The Rhetoric of Violence” because, although
this project is primarily concerned with the way that violence is interpreted by readers
and the subsequent effect of those interpretations, authors also use violence as a rhetorical
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tool in order to control or affect the interpretation that readers come away with, both in
conscious and unconscious ways, even if those ways are heavily dependant on context.
The Rhetoric of Trauma
Whether the author’s intent—or the text’s effect, independent of the author’s
intent—is to define identity through exclusion, shock people into turning to God’s grace,
or simply to express his or her own violent desires, the actual effect of violence on the
audience is a form of trauma. Modern theories of trauma begin with Freud, who
diagnosed “traumatic hysteria” as the state of a patient who has experienced so much
trauma that they are no longer able to process it (what today is diagnosed as Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder). The symptoms of trauma—the “hysteria” for Freud—are
often delayed from the actual experience, which led him to extrapolate on the process of
memory creation. For, if traumatic experience is “forgotten” for a period while the mind
is unable to process it, then traumatic memory is fundamentally different from nontraumatic memory. Freud theorized that trauma split the psyche into traumatic and nontraumatic sections, which are processed differently, going so far as to say that the
traumatic psyche acts like a foreign object in the brain. Cathy Caruth, in “Unclaimed
Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History,” explains, after reading and critiquing
Freud, that traumatic memory is characterized by a period of latency or belatedness,
wherein “the effects of the experience are not apparent” (186). As a result, the
remembering of trauma is experienced “only in connection with another place, and in
another time” (187). This leads Caruth to state, “For history to be a history of trauma
means that is it referential precisely to the extent that it is not fully perceived as it occurs”
(187). Thus, the narration of trauma can never be historically true; the narration of trauma
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can only be taken as a distortion or falsification of the reality of the event. The goal of
listening to trauma narratives, then, is “not only to listen for the event, but to hear in the
testimony of the survivor’s departure from it; the challenge of the therapeutic listener, in
other words, is how to listen to departure” (“Trauma and Experience” 10). Narrating
trauma, in effect, “is a repeated suffering of the event, [and] a continual leaving of its
site” (10). Thus, Caruth believes, that narrating trauma is harmful to the victim—making
them relive the trauma—and ineffective in education because it falsifies the trauma that
other’s seek to understand.
In the 90s, Holocaust studies looked to trauma theory to help explain the trauma
of the Holocaust and the latent symptoms of its victims. Theorists like Dominick LaCapra
began to explore the ways in which the symptoms of trauma could pass on to individuals
who did not experience the trauma for themselves—through what he calls “cultural
transmission.” To prevent this transmission of traumatic symptoms, LaCapra advocates
dealing with the trauma by “working-through” rather than “acting-out” (119)5. In
opposition to Caruth, LaCapra finds the narration of trauma very useful in working
through trauma in order to reduce traumatic symptoms (117-19). Although neither side
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Although this thesis doesn’t deal directly with the therapeutic effects of trauma
narration for trauma survivors, it might be important to briefly draw a distinction between
“working-through” or “acting-out” trauma. LaCapra offers a very succinct definition:
“Working-through means work on posttraumatic symptoms in order to mitigate the
effects of trauma by generating counterforces to compulsive repetition (or acting-out),
thereby enabling a more viable articulation of affect and cognition or representation, as
well as ethical and sociopolitical agency, in the present and future” (119). In essence,
because trauma tends to produce symptoms that are repetitive in nature, where one might
symbolically repeat the trauma—through a subconscious desire to “understand” what has
happened—or “act-out,” LaCapra advocates dealing with the symptoms consciously
through therapy, narration, etc., so as to bring (at least) partial conscious understanding to
the trauma and thereby mitigate the repetitive symptoms and hopefully keep from
culturally transmitting those symptoms to others.
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agrees on the purpose and result of sharing traumatic experience, they are united in their
belief that narrated trauma has a power outside of the traumatic experience itself.
These theorists and their constituent camps, have explored the power of trauma
narrative on the victims of trauma. But the study of how trauma narratives affect the
audience is what I am most concerned with when looking at trauma narratives from a
rhetorical perspective. For example, John Mowitt, in his essay “Trauma Envy,” explores
trauma as contributing to the appearance of moral authority given to those who have
experienced and expressed trauma. His idea is based on the social effects of guilt; if a
person (or political party) can show that they have been traumatized, those who inflicted
the trauma will be viewed as morally corrupt, the public, then, cedes the moral high
ground to the victim, whose request for redress seems more than fair (280-82). He applies
this idea to the political realm where he sees neoconservatives appropriating moral
authority from the perceived moral wound dealt to Americans during the 60s (279-80). In
dealing with the effects of trauma narrative on audiences, and the use of trauma
narratives by political parties for desired political capital, Mowitt is essentially
documenting the rhetorical effectiveness of trauma narratives. Accordingly, Mowitt’s
assertion that trauma narratives can bring about political change by affecting the audience
in certain desired ways, is exemplified in the respected Holocaust survivor, writer, and
lecturer, Elie Wiesel, who has used his Holocaust experience repeatedly in order to
influence policy and bring about social awareness and justice6. In addition, in “The
Politics of Negotiating Public Tragedy: Media Framing of the Matthew Shepherd
Murder,” Ott and Aoki show how the beating and subsequent death of a young
6

See “The Perils of Indifference,” “Nobel Lecture,” and “Dedication Address” listed in
works cited.
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homosexual man by two Montana men, gave moral authority to the gay rights movement
(220-32). In all of these examples, trauma is converted to political capital through guilt.
Historically, then, trauma narratives can be very effective rhetorical tools, especially
when creating guilt in order to persuade audiences to give moral authority to victimized
groups.
However, LaCapra argues that retelling trauma narratives can have a more
personal and profound impact on the audience or reader. He states that those who read or
hear trauma narratives “may experience aspects of trauma or undergo secondary
traumatization, at least through the manifestation of symptomatic effects such as extreme
anxiety, panic attacks, startle reactions, or recurrent nightmares, without personally living
through the traumatizing event to which such effects are ascribed” (114). So, in one
sense, moral authority is given to the perceived victim of trauma because, in some small
way, the audience has experienced the trauma through the trauma narrative and, as a
result, sympathizes with the victim—or the socio-political cause that has used the victim
as a representation of its ideals and goals.
In addition, Mowitt points out that another effect of trauma narratives can be
guilt, depending on how the trauma narrative is framed (280). In the case of
neoconservatives, Mowitt argues that because they can frame the Left as the moral
authority of the 60s and, consequently, for its moral decline, they can “deny that its
partisans bear any properly political responsibility for the traumas inflicted upon blacks
and women” (281). As a result, not only do they absolve themselves of responsibility, but
they implicate the majority of Americans as guilty of those acts. So not only can the
audience sympathize with those who tell trauma narratives, they can also be implicated as
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the perpetrator of the trauma, causing them to feel the guilt associated with inflicting
trauma and ceding moral authority to the victim as an act of compensation (281-82).
Regardless of the argument that trauma narrative can effect positive change (as Wright
and O’Connor are attempting), using trauma narratives to create guilt in an audience that
has not perpetrated any crime might seem manipulative and self-serving, especially for
the purposes of political gain.
Reading Violence, Inflicting Trauma
Beyond the use of trauma narrative for political gain, LaCapra points to the idea
that trauma, stemming from violence, can be foundational to the identity of a person or
group. For example, the crucifixion of Christ, a supreme act of violence, is the foundation
for Christian ideology and the Holocaust is foundational to twentieth-century Jewish
identity (LaCapra 114-15), just like the trauma of slavery is foundational to AfricanAmerican identity. Indeed, our own “deepest experiences of suffering, disturbance, loss
or even ecstasy” may not necessarily come out of living through personal trauma, but
through transhistorical trauma that is culturally transmitted (115-16), that is, trauma
experienced in a shared past that is transmitted through socio-cultural agencies. In fact,
Rene Girard cites the uniformity of sacrificial ritual and myth across cultures as proof
that a violent act might be foundational to all cultural/historical identites (92). Further, he
argues that once violence has been initiated in a community, a cycle of violence begins
from which the community cannot extricate itself (81). But violence will destroy a
community if violent impulses are directed inward for lack of an external enemy, so the
community ritualizes violence in order to provide an outlet for inherent violence. Girard
states:
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The rites of sacrifice serve to polarize the community’s aggressive
impulses and redirect them toward victims that may be actual or
figurative, animate or inanimate, but are always incapable of propagating
further vengeance. The sacrificial process furnishes an outlet for those
violent impulses that cannot be mastered by self-constraint; [. . . and]
prevents the spread of violence by keeping vengeance in check. (18)
For example, the ancient Jewish practice of scapegoating (pronouncing the sins of the
people upon an animal and then killing it or releasing into the wild to die) provides an
example of releasing violent impulses on a surrogate victim to appease the violence
inherent in human interaction7.
The idea that violence is foundational to cultural identity, however, is
problematic. For if cultural identity stems from trauma, then the resulting identity stems
from non-narrative memory and can only be reconstructed as artifice, a fictional
reimagining of events that cannot actually be remembered. Caruth calls into question the
validity of historical narrative specifically for this reason. She states,
[It is] in the equally widespread and bewildering encounter with trauma—
both in its occurrence, and in the attempt to understand it—that we can
begin to recognize the possibility of a history which is no longer
straightforwardly referential (that is, no longer based on simple models of
experience and reference). [. . .] we can understand that a rethinking of
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Similarly, Aristotle describes this purgation of emotion in general with his term
“catharsis.” His idea is that mimetic acts in drama serve to purge pity and fear from the
audience by modeling elevated—or proper—emotions in order to keep the emotions of
the audience in check (47-49). In both examples, the intent is to create a mimesis
whereby the audience can purge certain emotions through the mimetic acts.
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reference is not aimed at eliminating history, but at resituating it in our
understanding, that is, of precisely permitting history to arise where
immediate understanding may not. (“Unclaimed Experience” 182)
Here, Caruth is implying that the idea of history, as we know it, has risen out of the
inexplicability of trauma. She believes that when trauma cannot be understood
narratively, we create our own narrative to explain the trauma in order to make sense of it
ourselves. If, then, cultural identity arises out of history—which arises out of trauma—
then our narratives are not exactly true. As such, the work of both Girard and Caruth
point to a basic problem with trauma narrative when being used to form identity: that a
trauma narrative can never be completely, factually true. This is not to say that all
foundational identities are false, but that (as Caruth points out) they are never historically
true. This leaves room for foundational identities to be emotionally true to some extent,
but that emotional truth can only be conveyed and remembered through fictional
narratives.
As a result, the power of trauma narratives over an audience—whether they arise
from a political or literary sphere—leads one to question the reasons for inflicting
violence, even mimetically, on readers and whether the price of inflicting trauma is
greater than the effects of its possible social benefits. Although, Wright and O’Connor
seem to push for positive social change in their use of fictional violence, how are
audiences supposed to know in what context to interpret that violence? As well, if
neoconservatives—or any political movement—can create a feeling of guilt that gives
them moral authority, how can an audience make a judgment on the benefit of that guilt?
That is to say, the use of trauma narrative—which is to some extent always fictional—
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can be used for purposes that both benefit and harm readers and, in turn, society in
general. But the intent of using trauma cannot always be the standard by which the social
usefulness can be measured because, as pointed out earlier, the actual effects of trauma
narratives can differ greatly from any intended purposes depending on the audience and
context in which it is interpreted.
However, attempting to illustrate the social usefulness of trauma narratives,
LaCapra argues that trauma narration can have a curative act for victims of actual trauma
(as opposed to fictional trauma narratives). Although he acknowledges that the wound
that trauma has dealt to a victim can never be fully healed, he advocates a “working
through” of traumatic experience—including narration—in order to minimize the
symptoms of trauma in present-day life and hopefully open up future life possibilities for
victims by transforming a non-linear experience into a linear narrative that can be
examined and explored, even if imperfectly (117-22). In this light, the purpose of
narrating trauma is to create a curative effect for the victim. However, in Trauma:
Explorations in Memory, Caruth argues that, despite the curative effects that narration of
trauma can have for the victim, turning non-narrative memory into narrative is
problematic:
Beyond the loss of precision there is another, more profound,
disappearance: the loss, precisely, of the event’s essential
incomprehensibility, the force of its affront to understanding. [. . .] The
possibility of integration into memory and consciousness of history thus
raises the question, [. . .] “whether it is not sacrilege of the traumatic
experience to play with the reality of the past.” (“Recapturing” 154)
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LaCapra and others have called this view of trauma “sacralization or rendering sublime”
the experience of trauma (LaCapra 122). Caruth’s idea is that trauma is a sacred
experience for the victim and should not be shared because of its loss of power for the
victim, despite any pain or subsequent symptoms that this non-narrative experience may
continue to cause. In Caruth’s view, then, sharing trauma is not only a destruction of the
sublime experience of trauma, but sharing trauma narratives falsifies the trauma anyway,
nullifying any social benefit that a trauma narrative might have had.
Despite Caruth’s objections, LaCapra and others believe that sharing traumatic
experience can be beneficial not only to the victim, but to others as well, and he outlines
two possible scenarios in sharing trauma narratives: for the listener/reader the experience
can be vicarious or virtual. Vicarious trauma is a secondary traumatic experience in
which “one perhaps unconsciously identifies with the victim, becomes a surrogate victim,
and lives the event in an imaginary way that, in extreme cases, may lead to confusion
about one’s participation in the actual events” (LaCapra 125)8. For example, being asked
to “put yourself in the victim’s shoes,” either directly or though extremely graphic
imagery, is a common example of an attempt at creating a vicarious traumatic experience.
Whereas virtual trauma is an “experience of trauma, [where] one might imaginatively put
oneself in the victim’s position while respecting the difference between self and other and
recognizing that one cannot take the victim’s place or speak in the victim’s voice” (125).
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This in an interesting application of Girard’s idea of the sacrificial surrogate that purges
the violent impulses of a community. In Girard’s model, the surrogate is an object or
animal upon which the community can project its unwanted tendencies, but it is not an
object that the community can identify with on an emotional level. La Capra’s model is
interesting because replacing the inanimate object or animal with a human allows others
to identify with the victim and confuse themselves with the victim under certain
circumstances.
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Virtual trauma might be illustrated in the telling or reading of a victim’s story through a
third-person narrator who only describes the events and does not try to make any
emotional connection with the reader or audience. Although virtual trauma appears to
have obvious advantages in that non-victims might be able to—in some small way—
understand the experience of victims, vicarious traumatic experience has the potential not
only to nullify the singularity of a traumatic event (as asserts Caruth), but it can also lead
to the acting out of posttraumatic symptoms in those that have only secondarily
experienced the trauma (126). Take, for example, a religious group that has been
persecuted in the past, like the Jews or Mormons. Although physical persecution may
have ceased long ago, Mormons, for example, pass on stories of violent persecution that
form part of their foundational identity. Current members, who have never experienced
physical persecution but have been inculcated in Mormon history can appear uneasy or
uncomfortable when their religion is made public. This uneasiness, or apprehension,
about non-believers is a secondary posttraumatic symptom. By learning about
persecution at the root of the religion’s founding, the attitude toward non-believers
becomes one of apprehension for fear that the same traumas may be inflicted again, even
though physical persecution and trauma may be a remote possibility. This apprehension
is a small-scale acting out of the symptoms of trauma, although only experienced
secondarily. Thus, the infliction of vicarious trauma on a reader can have very powerful
consequences that may result in the acting out of posttraumatic symptoms. For this
reason, LaCapra states that “to judge whether [inflicting secondary trauma] is desirable
would entail considering how ethical, social, and political issues applied and whether
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they were preempted by higher-order considerations that were religious or ‘ethical’ in
some revised sense related to the quasi-religious” (129).
Toward a Theory of Reading Violence
Of course, dealing in terms as subjective as “ethics” or “quasi-religious morality”
is a bit dicey, to say the least, and is fraught with problems of academic rigor and basic
concerns about non-empirical study. However, analyzing violent texts for the purpose of
identifying their ideological framework, can help us to understand the contextuality of the
portrayals of violence. Determining the context of the violence can then give us an
insight into the ways in which the violence might serve certain purposes—social,
personal, political, etc.—which we can examine in light of creating a virtual or vicarious
traumatic experience for the reader. Examining the degree to which a text encourages a
vicarious or virtual experience, then, might help us to understand the actual traumatic
effect that the text has on readers and the degree to which traumatic symptoms might be
passed on, at which point we might be able to measure or evaluate, to some degree, the
social usefulness of violent texts within certain contexts.
In Chapter 2, I lay out a case for using Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic theory as a
starting point for understanding a text’s ideological framework, which creates the context
for violence, and the importance of using trauma theory to evaluate the results of a
dramatistic analysis of violent texts. As well, I go through a pair of short sample analyses
of Sebold’s The Lovely Bones and Wright’s Native Son using Burke’s dramatistic pentad
and trauma theory, in order to illustrate the type of analysis I am advocating. And in
chapter 3 and 4, I examine longer works, namely Palahniuk’s Fight Club and McCarthy’s
Blood Meridian, in order to explore the ways in which violence works to specific ends
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within longer more complex texts and the possible traumatic effects of violence on
readers when presented in the ideological contexts that the novels set up.
My ultimate desire is to provide a system by which violence may be examined—
not to condemn its use, but to understand its usefulness and demonstrate its effects on
readers, giving writers and readers tools to understand and responsibly use narrative
violence as a rhetorical tool.
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CHAPTER 2: DRAMATISM: ACTING OUT TRAUMATIC IMPACT
Brian Evenson, in the afterward to Altmann’s Tongue, makes it very clear that he
wants to assault the reader with the violence in his book. But why? As an answer,
Evenson states that, in his writing, “Violence, movement, ontology, and epistemology
deflect off one another and off other ideas and notions in a way that I hope will continue
to shimmer and shift after the experience of reading the book is over” (278). That is
indeed a vague answer for an author who wants “to draw the reader into the sensation of
having the gun snouting against his or her own fragile temple” (272). Physical assault is
an extreme and traumatizing experience, and perpetrating such violence against another
human being—one would hope—should have some good reason behind it other than
simply wanting the reader to think vaguely about “violence, movement, ontology, and
epistemology,” especially in light of the notion that trauma narratives can create
secondary traumatic symptoms in an audience. As such, traumatizing a reader through
narrative violence is not something to be taken lightly. Although one might argue that
Evenson’s fiction is merely, well, fiction, and that it doesn’t have any real physical
effects, it is evident that Evenson believes that his fiction can have physical effects, or he
would not be attempting to traumatize his audience in the first place.
Indeed, reading Evenson’s fiction feels like an assault, and I question his motives.
But regardless of an author’s intent in using violence, I believe there is a system by
which we might uncover the placement of motive in a piece of violent fiction itself
(which may contradict the author’s own stated purpose) to discover the underlying
ideological context of the violence and the rhetorical effect it might have. Specifically,
Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad is an extremely effective way to uncover motive and,
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in turn, the ideology of a given piece of text. Once that ideological context is uncovered
through use of Burke’s pentad, examining the ideology and the presentation of violence
in the context of trauma theory gives us an idea of whether the violence might encourage
repetitive acts or whether it might have the potential to create traumatic symptoms in the
reader and for what purpose.
The Ethics of Reading Violent Texts
In The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, Wayne Booth stays away from
picking sides in the battle of determining the ethics of a particular text. In fact the idea of
“sides” at all seems too narrow for Booth. He states, “The word ‘ethical’ may mistakenly
suggest a project concentrating on quite limited moral standards,” a system of belief that
teaches “‘Moral’ judgments,” aligning itself with one ideological position (Booth
Company 8). Instead of focusing on which decisions or actions adhere to some abstract
and subjective notion of right and wrong, he broadens his definition to include “all
qualities in the character, or ethos, of the authors and readers” (Company 8, emphasis
added). In this way, he avoids taking an ideological stance, which allows him the ability
to talk about the effects of narratives on readers in a general sense (as opposed to making
judgments on the effects themselves), avoiding sweeping generalizations that he
characterizes as a weakness of the so-called ethical criticism that has been done in the
past (Company 9).
Another benefit of Booth’s definition of ethics is the emphasis it places on the
reader. As quoted earlier, ethical criticism is not only concerned with the character of
authors, but with readers as well. That is to say that ethical criticism in the past has
forgotten about the readers and placed all emphasis on the author of a text, as Booth
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states, “label[ing] a given narrative or kind of narrative as in itself harmful or beneficial”
(9), eschewing the responsibility of a careful reading. The results of this type of criticism
abound in the echoes of critics who place all burden of ethics (or morality in this sense of
the word) on the text itself, blaming the text if the critics themselves cannot understand it,
or are offended by it. The results are the immediate condemnation of the text as a whole
based on surface details that may be considered racist, violent, or politically subversive in
some way. The effects of such hasty generalizations of a text move from simple
condemnation, to censorship, to—at its extreme—book burning. Instead, Booth
advocates an ethics of reading, one in which “the ethical reader will behave responsibly
toward the text and its author, [and] that reader will also take responsibility for the ethical
quality of his or her ‘reading.’” (Company 10).
It is this definition of ethics, one that accounts for author and reader, that is,
perhaps, the most useful when looking at violent texts. So often, violent narratives are
looked upon as gratuitous, or only for shock value—a device used by those who have
nothing else to say or are simply morally corrupt. For example, in the NCTE guideline,
“The Students’ Right to Read,” the National Counsel of Teachers of English declare that
censorship of novels in English classrooms is “often arbitrary and irrational” (par. 2).
However, a number of well-respected critics have explained narrative violence as having
a symbolic use or serving certain social purposes. Richard Slotkin, in Regeneration
Through Violence, explains narrative violence as a manifestation of the mythical violence
that has, in part, created American identity (5). As such, it has become a symbol of
regeneration. Aristotle explains, that the emotions of fear and pity (which could result
from depictions of violence) can be expunged through catharsis achieved through the
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artistic presentation of such emotions (47-49). Also, Girard, identifies ritual sacrifice
(violence transformed into narrative) as symbolic of the violence inherent within a
community (8). Even Burke recognizes that poetic violence can be “neutral” in that it is a
symbol “for transformation in general” (Rhetoric 11)9. These critics are not focusing on
condemning violent texts but on giving the audience explanations for the existence of
narrative violence and its function in society, placing the responsibility for interpretation
on the reader.
Uncovering Ideology through Pentadic Analysis
But despite the fact that violent texts have been both dismissed and academically
explained, uncovering the symbolism and meaning in violence requires going deeper than
surface elements of death, murder, or war. Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian linguist and
literary critic, theorizes that these small parts of the work—the “thematic content, style,
and compositional structure” (60)—serve only to create the actual unit of human
communication: the utterance, the text as a whole. Further, he argues that, the smaller
pieces that make up the work as a whole lose their individual meaning when they are
parts of a larger utterance such as a novel (62). Thus, it is the utterance that determines
the meaning of its smaller structural components not the other way around. So, the
surface features of a violent text (or the superficial acts of violence) can only be
understood within the framework of the utterance. So, if the utterance is a framework that
works to define the meaning of the individual parts of a text, the utterance exhibits a type
9

It is worth noting that even though Burke acknowledges the neutrality of poetic-violent
imagery, much of his overall project was concerned with transcending violence and war
through better communication. This is evidenced in part by the epigraph to A Grammar
of Motives: “Ad bellum purificandum” (Toward a purification of war). See also Burke’s
“Rhetoric—Old and New” for a discussion on rhetorical identification and transcendence
(full citation in Works Cited).
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of worldview or ideology10 within which other terms become meaningful. As such,
violent texts require an especially rigorous analysis to determine the ideological context
of the violence in the text as a whole. Simply put, the acts of violence in a text can only
be judged contextually and cannot be examined as acts independent of the text as a whole
unit. It is only within an analytical framework that accounts for the context of violent acts
where one can actually determine the overall rhetorical effect of a text as a whole, not
just its constituent parts. And perhaps the best system for examining the relationships
among all aspects of a work, including its philosophic base and the interaction between
its constituent parts as a whole, is Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad because it seeks to
uncover the ideology of a text through the interaction of its parts, or dramatistic ratios.
What Burke saw in other modes of critical inquiry was a lack of understanding
one’s own situatedness. In focusing on one aspect of a human drama, all other
perspectives were forgotten. Further, Burke observes that “the greater the absolutism of
the statements, the greater the subjectivity and relativity in the position of the agent
making the statements” (Grammar 512). In other words, the more absolute one’s critical
mode is, the less one recognizes that it is simply one perspective. What Burke offers,
instead, is a vocabulary that functions as a “representative anecdote” (324), a metaphor
(in this case, drama) that functions as a representation of the interaction of ideological
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James H. Kavanagh, in Lentricchia and McLaughlin’s Critical Terms for Literary
Study, states that “ideology designates a rich ‘system of representations,’ [. . .] which
helps form individuals into social subjects” (310). Thus, “Ideological analysis is
concerned with the institutional and/or textual apparatuses that work on the reader’s or
spectator’s imaginary conceptions of self and social order in order to call or solicit [. . .]
him/her into a specific form of social ‘reality’ and social subjectivity” (310). As such,
throughout this thesis, when I refer to ideology, I am not referring to any specifically
stated political or religious perspective, but rather the worldview or perspective of a
certain author, character, text, etc.
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perspectives. Drama works well for a discussion on motives because, as Burke states of
all critical modes, a particular mode doesn’t only reveal reality, “but rather it reveals only
such reality as is capable of being revealed by [a] particular kind of terminology” (313).
What dramatism offers, then, is a metaphor for human action that can be examined apart
from the reality of the situation itself, but whose parts accurately describe action and
reveal motivation. Burke explains,
Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or
about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what
kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different
words to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete statement
about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions:
what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it
(agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose). (xv)
Any answer to the above questions, as Burke points out, can be identified and discussed
using dramatistic language. As a result, the metaphor of drama is perfectly suited to
examine these relationships because of the vocabulary it uses.
To apply dramatisitic language to a given situation, one need only to identify the
different elements and assign appropriate terms (scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose).
Doing so not only allows one to abstract the physical parts, but it reveals the relationship
that the terms have with one another, illustrating a certain ideological perspective.
Specifically, identifying pentadic terms allows one to determine where on the pentad the
greatest emphasis for motive is placed and how the internal relationship between those
parts function (xv-xvi). The placing of motive is important because it reveals not only
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how a specific ideology interprets the world and catalogs experience, but it also reveals
where responsibility is placed within that ideological perspective.
For example, Tonn, Endress, and Diamond use dramatism to examine a tragic
accident in Maine where a young wife, and mother of two—Wood, was shot in her own
backyard by a hunter, Rogerson, who had left a designated hunting area. Tonn et al.
describe how the media was quick to absolve the hunter of any wrongdoing by placing
emphasis on “scene” (171). As the media framed it, the hunter had been confused by his
surroundings and simply shot at what he thought was the white tail of a deer, which
seemed natural (171-172). As such, he was not an agent, but simply a part of the natural
scene. On the other hand, the victim was framed as someone who was not a part of the
scene but an intruder (being a recent transplant to Maine); framed as such, the victim was
assigned the role of agent, bringing upon herself, her own death (174-178). Because of
this media framing, the hunter was acquitted of all charges in the victim’s death. In this
case, Tonn et al. were able to use the vocabulary of dramatism as a mode through which
they could identify pentadic terms and examine how the relationship of the terms could
uncover the social function (or implications) of the event’s rhetorical presentation.
Perhaps a more explicit example of using dramatism to examine the relationships
between ideological perspectives is Barry Brummett’s article, “A Pentadic Analysis of
Ideologies in Two Gay Rights Controversies.” Brummett examines the basic concept of
homosexuality with dramatism. In his analysis he finds that the gay rights movement
emphasizes the agent (253). They do so by taking the stance that acts are only a natural
product of being an agent, creating an agent:act ratio (253). On the other hand, anti-gay
rhetoric emphasizes the act as primary, arguing that “a person is gay because he/she does

Gunter 33
something” (255). The anti-gay movement, then, is creating an act:agent ratio where
people are defined by what they do, denying that gays are simply born gay. Brummett’s
analysis is interesting because it illustrates how dramatism can serve as a critical mode
that not only uncovers motive for action but can show relationships between different
motivational emphases within the pentad. In this case, Brummet is able to clarify that the
difference between the two factions is a fundamental difference in perspective. Thus
advocates on either side are not even arguing on the same terms and, as a result, will not
come to an understanding.
In both these instances, the authors were able to use the dramatistic pentad not
only to uncover motive and responsibility for action, but to present the dynamics of the
pentadic terms in ways that exposed the interaction of ideological perspectives. However,
simply uncovering the motives behind the rhetorical use of violence is a dead end, in and
of itself, because dramatism doesn’t offer a context within with to judge the ideologies
themselves, it simply uncovers them for examination. However, in addition to dramatism,
trauma theory seems to offer great insight into the rhetorical impact of violent text on an
audience. As discussed in the previous chapter, trauma theory deals specifically with the
way that symptoms of trauma are passed on and how they function socially and
culturally. As such, trauma theory serves as a critical mode that has the vocabulary to
deal with trauma narratives in a socio-cultural context. At this point, an examination of
violence through certain passages within a handful of texts might be useful, in order to
illustrate not only the relationship between Burke and violence, but the relationship
between pentadic analysis and trauma theory. Specifically, I’ll look at selections from
The Lovely Bones and Native Son, which not only depict violence but illustrate ways in
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which violence is used rhetorically. I will examine these texts with the system I have
indicated, using the dramatisitc pentad to uncover motive and ideology and using trauma
theory to explore the rhetorical impact, on readers, of violence within that context.
The Lovely Bones
The Lovely Bones, by Alice Sebold, was published in 2002 to favorable reviews.
The novel became a book club regular and is in development by Peter Jackson to be made
into a film. The book’s entry into popular culture seems odd considering that the book
centers around the rape and murder of a fourteen year-old girl and the emotional
aftermath of her family and those who knew her. Although the majority of the book
follows the family and friends of Susie, the murdered girl, as they deal with the trauma
that has hit them, the first chapter is the traumatic event itself: the rape and murder of
Susie Salmon. In an examination of trauma theory in general, the book in its entirety
might be useful, but, in an examination of violence, it is the first chapter that is the most
pertinent to our discussion.
Within this first chapter, there are some interesting pentadic dynamics at play, the
first of which is a structural emphasis on the primacy of the act itself. The structure of the
first chapter is a vacillation between juxtaposed images of the rape and Susie’s pondering
on the normal things in her life: her mousy brown hair, her junior high classes and
teachers, and her father’s embarrassing stories. Eventually the narrative becomes more
focused on what normal events are transpiring at the moment that Susie is trapped and
assaulted. These moments of innocence and everyday life are interspersed with the
disturbing dialogue of Mr. Harvey, the rapist, and Susie and the strange events leading to
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her death, like this exchange when Susie comes upon Mr. Harvey in the cornfield
between the junior high and her house, narrated by the dead Susie:
“I’ve built something back here,” he said. “Would you like to see
it?”
“I’m sort of cold Mr. Harvey,” I said, “and mom likes me home
before dark.”
“It’s after dark, Susie,” he said. (Sebold 7)
The events, and Mr. Harvey’s dialogue, become more disturbing as the chapter
progresses and Susie reluctantly enters an underground room that Mr. Harvey has dug out
in the middle of the cornfield:
“Look around,” he said.
I stared at it in amazement, the dug-out shelf above him where he
had placed matches, a row of batteries, and a battery-powered fluorescent
lamp that cast the only light in the room—an eerie glow that would make
his features hard to see when we was on top of me.
There was a mirror on the shelf, and a razor and shaving cream. I
thought that was odd. Wouldn’t he do that at home? But I guess I figured
that a guy who had a perfectly good split-level and then built an
underground room only half a mile away had to be kind of loo-loo. (10)
When Mr. Harvey begins to force himself onto Susie, the juxtaposing images begin to
vacillate more quickly and Susie begins to focus on the everyday things that she imagines
are going on while she is trapped with her attacker:
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I fought hard. I fought as hard as I could not to let Mr. Harvey hurt
me, but my hard-as-I-could was not hard enough, not even close, and I
was soon lying down on the ground, in the ground, with him on top of me
panting and sweating, having lost his glasses in the struggle.
I was so alive then. I thought it was the worst thing in the world to
be lying flat on my back with a sweating man on top of me. To be trapped
inside the earth and have no one know where I was.
I thought of my mother.
My mother would be checking the dial of the clock on her oven. It
was a new oven and she loved that it had a clock on it. “I can time things
to the minute,” she told her own mother, a mother who couldn’t care less
about ovens.
She would be worried, but more angry than worried, at my
lateness. As my father pulled into the garage, she would rush about, fixing
him a cocktail, a dry sherry, and put on an exasperated face: “You know
junior high,” she would say. (12-13)
These juxtapositions gradually become quicker and more stark until the climax of the act
itself:
“Susie! Susie!” I hear my mother calling. “Dinner is ready.”
He was inside me. He was grunting.
“We’re having string beans and lamb.”
I was the mortar, he was the pestle.
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“Your brother has a new finger painting, and I made apple crumb
cake.” (14)
Structurally, as these two parts of the narrative come closer together, becoming
successively quicker, tension builds as the narrator zooms in on the action and then pulls
back. Not only does it build tension but the movement of the narrative structure pushes
the reader toward a final act, a release of the tension, which seems like an inevitability. In
this way, the narrative is driven like the sex act itself, a rhythmic building of tension
toward a release. Structuring the narrative in this way focuses the narrative on the
moment of release—the act itself, making the other terms of the pentad subordinate. In
this manner, the narrative structure seems to place emphasis on act, creating an act:scene
ratio. Since the act is the driving force of the narrative structure, the act is the driving
force behind all action by agents.
At the same time that the structure focuses on act, Susie seems to focus on agent,
in disturbing ways, implying that she is, in part, responsible for her own rape. At multiple
points in the narration Susie takes responsibility for her own actions: “I felt like
observing my way out of there, but I didn’t” (8), “I was like I was in science class: I was
curious” (9), “I guess I was thinking that Mr. Harvey was a character, and I liked the
room, and it was warm, and I wanted to know how he had built it, what the mechanics of
the thing were and where he’d learned to do something like that” (10). Perhaps the
starkest example of Susie taking responsibility for her actions is after the rape when Mr.
Harvey asks Susie to get up off the ground. She narrates, “I could not move. I could not
get up” (15). Certainly, in some of the earlier examples one could argue that Susie is
simply reacting in a human way, telling the reader about her actions, but this last
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example, puts the others in perspective. She does not say that she did not know what
made her stay in her prostrate position—“something, some force, wouldn’t let me get
up”—but clearly uses the first-person pronoun, to take responsibility for her choice. This
action is highlighted when she states, in the following paragraph, “was it only that, only
that I would not follow his suggestion [that he killed me]?” (15). She clearly takes
responsibility for her own actions by questioning her decision, blaming herself for not
acting. Burke states that “when one talks of the will, one is necessarily in the field of the
moral; and the field of the moral is, by definition, the field of action” (Burke, Grammar
136). Thus, generally, by placing emphasis on the agent, one takes responsibility for
one’s own actions, which is usually considered a moral stance—being socially
responsible, yet which is disturbing in this context because Susie, by acting “morally” is
blaming herself for her own rape.
The idea that she takes the blame for her own actions is played out even more
disturbingly as she compares her rape to an intimate moment between two lovers. She
states, “Mr. Harvey made me lie still underneath him and listen to the beating of his heart
and the beating of mine. How mine skipped like a rabbit, and how his thudded, a hammer
against cloth. We lay there, our bodies touching” (Sebold 14). She describes his voice as
“gentle, encouraging, a lover’s voice on a late morning” (15). And when Mr. Harvey
says, “Tell me you love me,” Susie says, “Gently, I did.” Of course, she tells him she
loves him because she is afraid of him, but the language used here is sweet, soft and
alluring, the way one might remember a first love or other intimate moments. Susie
further incriminates herself in her own rape by intimating that although this was a
horrible experience (after she tells Mr. Harvey she loves him, he kills her), there is an air
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of complicity in her view of the situation. At the same time, Susie’s self-incrimination is
ironic—she blames herself for an act that she clearly had no control over, did not initiate,
and could not have stopped—which is underscored by the narrative’s emphasis on the
primacy of the act.
So, in the first chapter of The Lovely Bones, two ratios are at odds: act:scene and
agent:act. Whereas the act dictates the narrative structure, and thus the unfolding of the
scene and agents, Susie places emphasis on the agent, taking responsibility for her actions
and, in turn, the actions done to her. However, Susie’s emphasis on agent seems ironic
when placed in this specific scene because, although placing motive in the agent is a
moral stance, the narrative structure controls Susie, her situation, and the actions of Mr.
Harvey.
However, this is as far as we can go with pentadic analysis. Clearly, Susie’s
misplaced sense of blame and the primacy of the act make Susie a sympathetic character,
but the vocabulary of dramatism doesn’t provide a way to discuss the effect of that
sympathy on readers. The vocabulary of trauma studies, on the other hand, deals
specifically with how trauma affects individuals. In this case, the trauma victim is
sympathetic, but not easy for readers to identify with—or place themselves in the
perspective of. Since Susie’s perspective is ironic, identifying with her point of view
would be difficult because it would require the reader to agree with Susie and blame her
for her rape. As a result, the rhetorical effect of this scene is not vicarious. That is, The
Lovely Bones does not offer a reading wherein one can inhabit Susie’s ideological
perspective. If they cannot inhabit her perspective, readers are dissuaded from sharing in
co-victimhood with her, and hopefully dissuaded from sharing in any traumatic
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symptoms that this experience might produce. Instead, this scene lends itself toward a
virtual reading that depicts the act of rape in a way wherein readers might know of
Susie’s experience, which may make readers uneasy, but it may also help them to
understand victims of sexual violence without degrading victims’ experience by
sacralizing it.
In sum, analyzing the first chapter of The Lovely Bones with pentadic analysis
leads us to an understanding of Susie’s ideology as a character within the larger
ideological context of the chapter. In addition, application of the vocabulary of trauma
studies to the resulting dynamic between Susie’s ideological perspective and the narrative
structure helps us to realize that although the chapter is graphic and disturbing, it may
help readers to understand the violence of rape and understand victims’ mindset without
encouraging readers to participate in the traumatic symptoms of a physical rape.
Native Son
Richard Wright’s Native Son is similar to The Lovely Bones in that it also deals
with the death of a girl, although under very different circumstances and from the killer’s
perspective. Also, there is a different pentadic dynamic at work in the killing and
mutilation of Mary Dalton. The pentadic terms that are most at play after Bigger kills
Mary are scene, agent, and act.
First, from the beginning of the novel, Bigger feels controlled by scene: he is a
black man living in a white man’s world. When he goes to interview for the chauffer job
with Mr. Dalton, he feels uncomfortable, stiff, and constantly questions whether he is
acting the way he should around white people: “There was an organic conviction in him
that this was the way white folks wanted him to be when in their presence; none had ever
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told him that in so many words, but their manner had made him feel that they did” (48).
Already, Bigger feels that he is in a completely foreign world with rules he doesn’t know
and if not followed would lead to regrettable consequences. As a result, his first thought
after he realizes he has inadvertently killed Mary is one of scene: “The reality of the room
fell from him; the vast city of white people sprawled outside took its place. She was dead
and he had killed her. He was a murderer, a Negro murderer, a black murderer. He had
killed a white woman” (87). Instead of focusing on the morality of his act, Bigger focuses
on scene because it is the most powerful determinate of action in his world: he is not a
murderer; he is a black murderer in a white scene. And scene becomes a controlling
factor in Bigger’s actions from this point on, which sets up an initial scene:agent ratio.
However, the other term at work here is act. If Bigger is letting scene define him
as an agent, scene is also driving Bigger’s actions. That is, scene is the defining force, but
in order to avoid the inevitability of the scene (which it is his purpose to avoid), Bigger is
driven to act. In fact, immediately after deciding that he is going to cover up the murder,
his language turns from discussions of how he is part of the scene to how the scene drives
him against his will to commit horrible acts. From that time until the body is disposed of,
the narrator repeats the exact phrase “he had to” ten times, and there are multiple other
references to Bigger’s reluctance to act that are reinforced by a reiteration of his purpose
to avoid the inevitability of the scene. If, then, Bigger is forced to do what he does, he is
not responsible for his actions. So, responsibility for action is placed solely on scene.
Because of the interplay between scene, act, and purpose, Bigger’s ideology can be
thought of as an “ends justify the means” attitude toward his life and actions.
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This ideology, however, is complicated by Bigger’s role as a victim of scene, driven
against his will to cover up an accident.
An “ends justify the means” ideology is not particularly sympathetic because it
implies an ability to choose means (acts). But Bigger is also sympathetic because,
rhetorically, he does not control his actions or situation: the scene defines how he must
act—in ways he abhors. In this way, readers should feel sorry for Bigger, sympathizing
with him. However, although Bigger is sympathetic in one sense, he also defies sympathy
because his ideology implies motive and choice. In fact, Wright has created a situation in
which readers are uncomfortable with their sympathy for the main character because,
although his situation is controlled by scene—giving him a limited set of options—the
options he chooses are extreme and abhorrent. For example, the passage below describes
Bigger mutilating Mary’s body:
Gently, he sawed the blade into the flesh struck a bone. He gritted his teeth
and cut harder. As yet there was no blood anywhere on the knife. But the
bone made it difficult. [. . .] Then blood crept outward in widening circles
of pink on the newspapers, spreading quickly now. He whacked at the
bone with the knife. The head hung limply on the newspapers, the curly
black hair dragging about in the blood. He whacked harder, but the head
would not come off. [. . .] He had to burn this girl. [. . .] He saw a hatchet.
Yes! That would do it. He spread a neat layer of newspapers beneath the
head, so that the blood would not drip on the floor. He got the hatchet,
held the head at a slanting angle with his left hand and, after pausing in an
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attitude of prayer, sent the blade of the hatchet into the bone of the throat
with all the strength of his body. The head rolled off. (92)
In addition to making Bigger more sympathetic by taking away the responsibility for his
actions through depersonalizing Mary’s body and the agencies through which he
mutilates her body11, this passage inflicts trauma on the reader by its graphic and stark
depiction of human mutilation. Contrarily, just as Bigger’s situation makes him
sympathetic, the graphic nature of his acts resists a vicarious reading that would require
close identification with Bigger, putting the reader in Bigger’s shoes. In terms of trauma
studies, the reader’s conflicted sympathy for Bigger makes him very hard to identify
with, making the experience of reading this violence nothing but virtual for the simple
fact that, if readers cannot whole-heartedly identify with Bigger, they cannot share in his
experience or take part in the subsequent traumatic symptoms.
As stated in Chapter One, Wright’s purpose was to make a book that was “so hard
and deep that [readers] would have to face it without the consolation of tears” (“Bigger”
454). In this case, pentadic analysis allowed us to uncover the motives at work in and on
Bigger, which, alone, would seem to work against Wright’s purpose, making Bigger
sympathetic (i.e., something readers could cry over). However, further analysis with the
vocabulary of trauma studies suggests that the nature of the sympathy is problematic,
resisting a vicarious reading, and actually fulfilling Wright’s stated purpose for good or
ill.
11

Depersonalizing Mary’s body comes in the form of calling it “the head,” “the hair,”
and “the bone” instead of Mary’s head, Mary’s hair, or Mary’s throat. And
depersonalizing the agencies consists of using the terms “the knife,” “a hatchet,” not “my
knife,” “Their hatchet”—especially when the action of cutting off Mary’s head is given to
the hatchet, not Bigger: “sent the blade of the hatchet into the bone,” not “Bigger cut
Mary’s head off with a hatchet.”
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Moving Toward an Understanding of Violence
Determining motive in violent fiction allows us to examine the ideology that
stems from that motive and creates a context within which the rhetoric of violence might
be discussed. But although pentadic analysis is very good at uncovering motive for
action, it does not serve as a mode in which one can measure the effect of the contextual
violence on readers. In the selections from Native Son and The Lovely Bones, pentadic
analysis allows us to examine the motives at work in the text, which lead to underlying
ideologies. From that point, using the terminology of trauma studies may provide a better
understanding of the way that violence inflicts trauma on the reader and works to identify
how the author’s use of trauma might serve a social or political function. In The Lovely
Bones the use of violence, in context, may serve to help readers sympathize with rape
victims without giving them the sense that they fully understand what it is to be a rape
victim; in Native Son the contextual violence seems to push readers away from
identification with Bigger for Wright’s own social purposes. The next two chapters will
explore these dynamics in two longer, more complex texts and, hopefully, provide an
example of how violence can function rhetorically on readers and audiences, illustrating
socially productive and unproductive ways of using and interpreting narrative violence.

Gunter 45
CHAPTER 3: DECONSTRUCTING TYLER DURDEN:
THE RHETORIC OF VIOLENCE IN FIGHT CLUB
In the spring of 2000, a group of ten Brigham Young University students began
holding a fight club on Monday nights. These fight clubs grew to the point that crowds of
250-300 men and women would show up in backyards and public parks. Then neighbors
began calling the police to complain about noise and report suspicious activity. The
founders deny that any inspiration came from the movie Fight Club, released in theaters
fewer than six months earlier. Their denial comes despite the fact that the Provo fight
club was a fairly secretive organization (members fought under aliases, the fight location
was kept secret until a few hours before the event and spread by word-of-mouth) that
pitted men with no boxing experience against each other for the rush of adrenaline—
almost the exact plot of the movie. Although the BYU school newspaper only references
the movie once in its multi-month coverage of the events (Perry par. 21)—which
eventually ended due to pressure from local law enforcement—other local media made
the connection between the movie and the local events fairly prominent. In addition, one
unidentified fight club member told The Daily Universe, the BYU school newspaper,
“It’s just you feel that adrenaline—like at the top of the roller coaster for three or four
minutes. It's a wonderful feeling” (par. 5) which seems to be in the general spirit of the
film’s attitude toward violence. Chuck Palahniuk, author of the book that the movie is
based on, says that before the hype and success that followed, Fight Club was just a
stylistic experiment (212-13). But Palahniuk’s act of experimentation turned into a novel,
a regional bestseller, a critically acclaimed movie, and, finally, a cultural phenomenon.
The cultural effect of the fight club philosophy (the one that leads young men to mimic
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the traumatic acts that are portrayed in the novel with the hope of creating some new
identity for oneself) is perhaps the most interesting. In essence, the basic idea of Fight
Club is that one can transcend ordinary life through trauma and self-destruction.
Palahniuk states that when the kernels of the novel were beginning to form in his
head,
the bookstores were full of books like The Joy Luck Club and Divine
Secrets of the Ya-Ya Sisterhood and How to Make an American Quilt.
These were all novels that presented a social model for women to be
together. To sit together and tell their stories. To share their lives. But
there was no novel that presented a new social model for men to share
their lives. (214)
What Palahniuk wanted to do was create a model for men to come together in the same
way women bonded, but the structure of the new model needed to be expressly
masculine. He jokes that he could have written “‘Barn-Raising Club’ or ‘Golf Club’ [. . .]
something nonthreatening” (214). But he had to write something threatening, something
that would clearly define the boundary between femininity and masculinity, something
“not too touchy feely” (214). In this way, Palahniuk is much like Richard Wright, in that
Wright included extreme content in Native Son so that “no one would weep over it; that it
would be so hard and deep that they would have to face it without the consolation of
tears” (“Bigger” 454). In the same way that Wright is drawing a boundary with his
content to resist white sympathy, Palahniuk is creating a border made of extreme violence
in order to create a boundary that women (who already have models for emotionally
fulfilling social interaction) cannot cross, in order to create a new definition of
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masculinity separate from the feminizing forces of modern consumer culture. But,
although attempting to create a modern model of masculine identity might be admirable,
Palahniuk’s methods serve to create paradoxical ideologies, emphasizing act-agent ratios,
that glorify the violence of self-destruction for the purposes of transcendence and
encourages traumatic repetition of the destructive acts depicted in the novel.
Dramatism and Consumer Culture
The novel sets up a dramatistic ratio where men have become part of the specific
scene of consumer culture. After his apartment is blown up, Fight Club’s unnamed
narrator reflects on his foolish desire and competition for consumer goods by
enumerating the possessions he lost, dwelling on ridiculous details to emphasize the
sarcastic effect: A “Haparanda sofa group with orange slip covers,” a “Johanneshov
armchair in the Strinne green stripe pattern,” “Rislampa/Har paper lamps made from wire
and environmentally friendly unbleached paper,” “The Alle cutlery service,” “The Vild
hall clock made of galvanized steel,” “The Klipsk shelving unit,” and the “Hemlig hat
boxes” (Palahniuk 43-44). Afterward, the narrator expresses the depressing truth about
his consumer driven life: “you’re trapped in your lonely nest, and the things you used to
own, now they own you” (44). Here, the novel begins to debunk the myth of the ownerpossession paradigm and suggests that it is not the owner who defines his possessions,
but that an owner’s possessions define his identity. In this reversal, the narrator becomes
part of the scene of consumer culture, creating a scene:agent ratio in which the agent is
defined by the scene. And, by extension, any action that would appear to be the will of
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the agent is really just an extension of the scene, changing the agent’s perceived action
into simple motion12.
If the idea that consumer culture was controlling all of us were the end of the
critique of consumer culture, it would apply to men and women equally, but it does not.
The novel characterizes consumer culture as a feminizing force that emasculates men,
taking away their masculine identity. This feminization of masculinity through consumer
culture is expressed with comments like, “the people I know who used to sit in the
bathroom with pornography, now they sit in the bathroom with their IKEA furniture
catalogue” (Palahniuk 43). Replacing pornography with furniture catalogs seems to
replace heterosexual virility with feminine nesting, which would turn men from, what
might be considered, positive heterosexual affirmation to feminized homemakers.
Feminization continues as the narrator names off the color options of a “Mommala quiltcover set”: “Orchid. Fuschia. Cobalt. Ebony. Jet. Eggshell or heather” (44). Not only are
men redirecting their sex drives toward home furnishings but they are expressing
traditionally feminine characteristics, like worrying about the color of the bedspread.
Susan Faludi, in Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man, comments that not only are
men increasingly “measured only by participation in celebrity-driven consumer culture”
but success in consumer culture is “fraught with gender confusion for its ‘feminine’
implications of glamour and display” (39). This display of commercial masculinity
consists of “objectification, passivity, infantilization, pedestal-perching, and mirror12

This is the Burkian sense of “motion” which connotes the physical, “subverbal,” or
“extraverbal,” realm of actions that are done without thinking or by instinct. In this
context, the perceived actions of a man are not really his actions, but motion he carries
out as dictacted by the scene of consumer culture. Motion is interrupted by “action” that
is deliberate. See “Linguistic Approach to Problems in Education” (260-61), full citation
in Works Cited.
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gazing” that “have long been designated as the essence of feminine vanity” (39) to the
point that, for men, the “gentleman’s cigar club [is] no more satisfying than a ladies’
bake-off, the Nike Air Jordan no more meaningful than the Dior New Look” (40). Thus,
the narrator’s characterization of the scene of consumer culture specifically deals with the
problem of the feminizing of masculine identity. And this characterization situates him
within a scene:agent ratio that defines and controls him, not allowing him the ability to
define his own identity.
To combat the oppression of the scene, Tyler Durden and the narrator attempt to
redefine their masculinity in a way that separates them from the dominant culture. So, in
contrast to the scene:agent ratio, Tyler advocates an act:agent ratio through which violent
acts serve not only to define the agent, but also to create a barrier between masculine
identity and feminizing consumerism. Tyler asks the narrator, “I want you to do me a
favor. I want you to hit me as hard as you can” (Palahaniuk 52). Although, at this point,
neither man knows exactly what this act of violence is going to do, “Tyler explained it
all, about not wanting to die without any scars, about being tired of watching only
professionals fight, and wanting to know more about himself” (52). Tyler’s explanation
that he is tired of watching only professionals fight shows a disdain and willful rejection
of celebrity-consumerism, exemplifying Tyler’s desire to redefine his masculinity apart
from the dominant cultural model. Not only that, but the desire to know more about
oneself through violence expresses a paradigm that breaks from the consumerist scene of
self-identity—based on possessions—and emphasizes action as a way to define one’s
own identity. Essentially, Tyler and the narrator are unsatisfied with the ways in which
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scene has defined their masculinity and attempt to define themselves through acts of
violence as a way to break from the scene.
The Paradox of the Fight Club Ideology
However, the method through which acts define the agent problematizes the
act:agent ratio. Not only does violence define the agent, but—in the novel—true identity
comes from complete self-destruction: “Tyler says I’m nowhere near hitting bottom, yet.
And if I don’t fall all the way, I can’t be saved. Jesus did it with his crucifixion thing. I
shouldn’t just abandon money and property and knowledge. This isn’t just a weekend
retreat. I should run from self-improvement, and I should be running toward disaster”
(70). Tyler also states, “The lower you fall, the higher you’ll fly” (141). But the idea that
self-destruction saves you is paradoxical and ill conceived. Although in the JudeoChristian tradition there certainly exists the idea of repentance, where one destroys an old
self in order to make a new self, those rituals focus on non-violent cleansing (such as
baptism) or projecting the self onto a surrogate who is destroyed (animal sacrifice). In
fact, the idea that Tyler wants to model himself after Jesus is fallacious because Jesus’
intention was not self-improvement; rather, Jesus acted as the surrogate for the sinful self,
so that the community could be renewed. Granted, Tyler’s ideology consists not in death,
but in destroying the self as it has been defined by consumer culture; however, that
redemption is achieved through bodily harm and the threat of death. For example, the
narrator describes the transformation that occurs through violence at fight club:
You saw this kid who works in the copy center, a month ago you saw this
kid who can’t remember to three-hole-punch an order or put colored slip
sheets between the copy packets, but this kid was a god for ten minutes
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when you saw him kick the air out of an account representative twice his
size then land on the man and pound him limp. (48-49)
In this example, not only does self-destruction create a new identity, but violence toward
others helps one throw off consumer culture and reclaim one’s masculinity. Of course, in
this example, there is no regard for the health or safety of the beaten account manager:
the quest to become an agent is self-centered. So not only is the fight club ideology
paradoxical because it emphasizes self-destruction as a path to self-discovery, but it is
problematic because it focuses on destruction of others as a means of gaining
transformation unto salvation—putting others down in order to lift oneself up.
At the same time that the quasi-religion of fight club offers redemption—a
separation from the scene—it places restrictions on the agent, defining the agent only as a
member of a new collective of other enlightened bottom-hitters. When fight club attains
more popularity and more and more men start showing up to fight, it becomes a
systematized institution, and a new rule is created: “Nobody’s the center of fight club
except the two men fighting” (142), in contrast to the old format where Tyler or other
fight club chapter leaders acted as organizers, standing in the center of the room, giving
the rules. Now, “the leader’s voice will yell, walking slowly around the crowd, out in the
darkness” (142), eschewing individuality in favor of group identity. In fact, although the
overt ideological message is one of self-empowerment through self-discovery, fight
club’s actual practice is to destroy individuality in favor of a new collective identity. In
fact, recruits to Project Mayhem—the terrorist group created by Durden and made up of
elite members of fight club—repeat self-derogatory aphorisms like “You are not a
beautiful and unique snowflake. You are the same decaying organic matter as everyone
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else, and we are all part of the same compost pile” (134) as well as “I am the all-singing,
all dancing crap of the world, [. . .] I am the toxic waste by-product of God’s creation”
(169). These self-derogatory statements serve to reinforce the abolition of individuality
for members of Project Mayhem. In fact, the rules of Project Mayhem expel members
who separate themselves from the group through arrest or death. When police shoot Big
Bob, the ex-body builder, on a Project Mayhem assignment, the narrator explains why
Bob didn’t just give up when the police drew their guns: “It was better to get hurt then
arrested, because if you were arrested, you were off Project Mayhem” (177). Big Bob had
shaved his hair and burned his fingerprints off with lye (177) in order to become eligible
for Project Mayhem and wasn’t about to get kicked off, ostracized by the group that had
given him redemption through self-destruction. The narrator states, “Only in death will
we have our names since only in death are we no longer part of the effort” (178).
Paradoxically, the appeal of fight club is its promise of liberation, yet the further one
initiates into fight club—reaching Project Mayhem—liberation is turned into groupthink.
One moves from passive participation in consumer culture, which extinguishes
individuality, to active participation in Project Mayhem, where one loses individuality;
breaking scene to become an agent, is the initiation into a new scene where one gives up
their agent status. Thus, the fight club promise is not only paradoxical, but a mirage.
Essentially, then, the stated ideologies of the book—the ideas that many readers cling
to—are self-contradictory, and cancel themselves out which creates an overall weakness
in the overt ideological message of the novel.
So the mirage of fight club is the fact that it offers salvation from consumer
culture in the form of freedom and self-identity; however, the projected ends of fight club
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have nothing to do with individuality or personal salvation. That is, the stated ideologies
of the book only serve to mask an underlying ideology. All in all, the ends of fight club
serve as a justification for the means by which it is accomplished. In fact the stated aim of
Project Mayhem is to destroy humanity to the point where the earth can start over again.
Basically, in the view of Project Mayhem, humans have destroyed everything that they
have ever touched and the narrator and Tyler believe that they are the ones who have
been left to clean up the mess: “For thousands of years, human beings had screwed up
and trashed and crapped on this planet, and now history expected me to clean up after
everyone” (124). But instead of cleaning it up, they think it would be better to destroy
everything and start over again:
It’s Project Mayhem that’s going to save the world. A cultural ice age. A
prematurely induced dark age. Project Mayhem will force humanity to go
dormant or into remission long enough for the earth to recover. [. . .] Like
fight club does with clerks and box boys, Project Mayhem will break up
civilization so we can make something better out of the world. (125)
These ends are the only thing that matter, in fact human destruction is expected. As stated
earlier, the search for self-identity is self-centered; similarly, the quest to save the world
does not care about casualties. As Tyler says, “You justify anarchy. [. . .] You figure it
out” (125). And making no individual more important than the project only serves to
emphasize the fact that the ends of the project justify the destruction it creates. Following
the rationale of Project Mayhem, just as total self-destruction results in a better you, total
world destruction creates a better world, and the means of that destruction do not matter
so much as the end result.
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On a smaller scale, the “ends justify the means” ideology is best illustrated by the
“human sacrifice” of Raymond K. Hessel. The purpose of a human sacrifice is to pick a
random man and get him to live life by fulfilling his desires, desires that have been taken
from him by commercial culture. Randomly-picked Raymond wants to be a veterinarian.
The narrator holds a gun to Raymond K. Hessel’s head and tells him, “I know who you
are. I know where you live. I’m keeping your license, and I’m going to check on you,
mister Raymond K. Hessel. In three months, and then in six months, and then in a year,
and if you aren’t back in school on your way to becoming a veterinarian, you will be
dead” (154). The narrator describes the way he frightens Raymond with his gun:
I pressed the wet end of the muzzle to the tip of your chin, and then the tip
of your nose, and everywhere I pressed the muzzle, it left a shining wet
ring of your tears. [. . .] I pressed the wet end of the gun on each cheek,
and then on your chin, and then against your forehead and left the muzzle
pressed there. (154)
The narrator envisions the result of this sacrifice: “Raymond K. K. [sic] Hessel, your
dinner is going to taste better than any meal you’ve ever eaten, and tomorrow will be the
most beautiful day of your entire life” (155). Certainly, one can imagine that Raymond’s
life will be in vivid Technicolor after having his brief encounter with violence, thinking
that he might die, but the dramatic methods of the awakening might be considered
excessive or grotesque. But those means are unimportant; if the subject has an
awakening, then the goal of this homework assignment is fulfilled, despite any physical
or psychological harm caused to Raymond K. Hessel—the ends justify the means.
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This “ends justify the means” ideology focuses attention on purpose and its
supremacy over the other terms of the pentad. In fact, in this model, the purpose defines
the act (which, in turn, defines the other terms of the pentad). That is, if the purpose is
righteous, then the acts in the name of that purpose are righteous, without regard to
morality, social norm, or even human life.
Traumatic Impact
As previously shown, the fight club promise of agent-ness only amounts to a
change of scene in that the culmination of fight club—Project Mayhem—results in a loss
of identity similar to the loss of identity caused by consumer culture. Combined with a
motivational emphasis on purpose, fight club’s message is very manipulative and
dangerous to the characters in the novel. But the acts in the novel are fictitious, and as
such aren’t actually damaging to any physical person or property. However, the
presentation of these acts are not presented in a way that discourages readers from actingout the fight club ideology. In fact, the ideology and acts of violence in Fight Club are
presented in such a way that glorifies and encourages traumatic repetition of the events in
the narrative despite the novel’s ideological weaknesses.
In chapter 1, I discussed trauma theory and the impact that narrative trauma can
have on readers. Specifically, there are two modes in which narrative trauma can be
expressed: virtual and vicarious13. In Fight Club, the rhetorical presentation of the
narrative and its ideological message encourage a vicarious reading experience through

13

This is not necessarily to say that a violent text has to be completely virtual or
completely vicarious but that different texts will encourage one reading over another
through the rhetorical presentation of the violence they portray.
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the lack of a name for the narrator, the direct address/present tense style of the prose, and
the valorization (or glorification) of the ideology and actions of the narrator/Tyler.
First, Fight Club’s protagonist has no name. The lack of a name allows the
narrator to become a blank for everyman, which is also illustrated by his lack of physical
description. Further, the narrator never overtly expresses any real emotion. Instead he
characterizes himself as different body parts that inform the reader of the narrator’s
emotional state. In fact, the body parts (and, eventually, emotional states) that the narrator
uses, don’t even belong to him, but to a fictional man named Joe: “I am Joe’s raging bile
duct [. . .] I am Joe’s grinding teeth. I am Joe’s inflamed flaring nostrils” (59), “I am
Joe’s boiling point” (71), “I am Joe’s blood boiling rage” (96), “I am Joe’s smirking
revenge” (114), “I am Joe’s broken heart” (134), “I am Joe’s complete lack of surprise”
(138), “I am Joe’s cold sweat” (184), “I am the pit of Joe’s stomach” (185). These body
parts are referred to in the third person which allows the reader to understand the
narrator’s emotions, yet the reader doesn’t have to identify with the emotions because
they are projected onto a third person, which is neither the narrator or the readers. This
lack of a name and avoidance of personal emotional expression allows readers to project
their own traits, personality, and emotions onto the narrator. This projection creates the
sense that the reader should encounter the text vicariously—as if he were actually the
narrator, taking his place in both inflicting and receiving violent acts—allowing the
reader to live though the events of the novel personally, not though a third party. Giving
readers a vicarious experience of violence creates a simulated traumatic experience that
invites readers to claim traumatic symptoms—which may be acted-out through the
repetition of the violence in the novel.
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Also adding to the vicarious traumatic experience of the novel is the narrator’s
intermittent style of using the present tense and directly addressing the reader. Both
present tense and direct address are used in the first chapter, setting the tone for the rest
of the novel. The opening line states, “Tyler gets me a job as a waiter, after that Tyler’s
pushing a gun in my mouth and saying, the first step to eternal life is you have to die”
(11). Shortly afterward, the narrator addresses the reader and tells him how to make
silencer holes in a gun, make plastic explosives, and brew nitroglycerin: “You take a 98percent concentration of fuming nitric acid and add the acid to three times that amount of
sulfuric acid. Do this in an ice bath. Then add glycerin drop-by-drop with an eye dropper.
You have nitroglycerin” (12). As well, throughout the novel, there is the repetition of the
phrase “you wake up at” followed by the name of an airport, which dictates that the
reader should be in a certain place and time, further making the experience of the novel
more dictatorial than it would be if experienced through a removed, third-person narrator.
The examples illustrated above, and others, create a feeling in the reader that the narrator
is conversing with him, interacting with him, which differs from a third-person account
that puts the reader in an observational role rather than a participatory one. These styles
draw the reader into a more personal relationship with the narrator and the text, creating a
setting where the action of the novel is more “real,” adding to the sense that reading this
novel should be a vicarious experience.
Although the two structural elements above encourage a vicarious reading
experience, the ideological perspective of the novel, as well, reinforces a vicarious
traumatic reading and encourages traumatic repetition. First and foremost, Tyler—who is
responsible for inflicting trauma—is heroized, not condemned for the things that he does.

Gunter 58
In fact, Tyler is rhetorically framed as a type of savior: “Oh. Tyler, please rescue me,”
“Deliver me from Swedish furniture,” “Deliver me from clever art,” “Deliver me, Tyler,
from being perfect and complete” (46). Once it is revealed that Tyler and the narrator are
one and the same (Tyler being a split-personality hallucination) the narrator embarks on a
mission to destroy himself, so he can heroically stop the fulfillment of Project Mayhem.
As a result, not only does the protagonist become the savior when Tyler’s identity is
revealed, but he also changes roles to become the savior who will stop world destruction
by stopping Project Mayhem—which he does through the displays of masculinity that
have been advocated throughout the novel. For example, the narrator tries to take
evidence to the police only to be confronted by a group from Project Mayhem who
attempt to castrate him. He escapes castration without explanation, retaining his
manhood, so to speak. Then, he goes to a fight club and attempts to kill himself by
fighting everyone there, which he also survives—inexplicably—like some sort of
impervious superhero. The narrator’s last attempt is to kill himself by shooting himself in
the head which, again, he survives, blowing a hole through his cheek instead of the back
of his head. These attempts, although they are an attempt to destroy Project Mayhem,
ironically reinforce the fight club aesthetic of masculine display and prove to the reader
the “truthfulness” of the fight club ideology. Rhetorically, then, although the narrator
superficially tries to condemn the fight club ideology by attempting to stop Project
Mayhem, he only does so through application of the ideology he is condemning, thus
demonstrating to readers that the fight club ideology is admirable and can be a means to
salvation, which encourages readers to duplicate the narrator’s and Tyler’s actions
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because the novel both encourages readers to participate in a vicarious reading experience
and valorizes the fight club ideology.
As well, even though the narrator fights to end Project Mayhem, the end of the
novel finds him ambivalent about the outcome. Instead of condemning Tyler’s actions
and ideological perspective, the narrator shows no remorse for his actions and, thus,
continues to reiterate the fight club ideology. In the mental hospital, where he resides at
the end of the novel, the narrator has the following conversation with himself:
I’ve met God across his long walnut desk with his diploma
hanging on the wall behind him, and God asks me, “Why?”
Why did I cause so much pain?
Didn’t I realize that each of us is a sacred, unique snowflake of
special unique specialness?
Can’t I see how we’re all manifestations of love?
I look at God behind his desk, taking notes on a pad, but God’s got
this all wrong.
We are not special.
We are not crap or trash, either.
We just are.
We just are, and what happens just happens.
And God says, “No, that’s not right.”
Yeah. Well. Whatever. You can’t teach God anything. (207)
Granted, the narrator does not whole-heartedly endorse Tyler’s ideology, but his “new”
philosophy of “just being” doesn’t reject Tyler’s beliefs either. Combined with the fact
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that the narrator does nothing to quell the agents of Project Mayhem around him—those
hospital workers who whisper to him, “We miss you Mr. Durden,” “Everything’s going
according to the plan,” “We’re going to break up civilization so we can make something
better out of the world,” and “We look forward to getting you back” (208)—the narrator
gives the impression that he does not condemn what they do, nor the ideological
viewpoint they still ascribe to, backhandedly endorsing it and encouraging the
continuation of fight club and Project Mayhem. Because Tyler is still a hero and the
narrator doesn’t condemn his actions, the novel perpetuates an ideology of redemption
through self-destruction. In addition, because the novel encourages a vicarious reading, it
invites readers to participate in its violence and—encouraged by Tyler’s ideology—
symptomatically repeat it.
The Social Usefulness of Fight Club
Perhaps what is most intriguing about Fight Club and its paradoxical and selfcontradictory philosophy is the author’s attitude toward the way that his own novel
perpetuates violence. In the afterword to the current edition of the novel, Palahniuk
enumerates the effect that his novel and the subsequent movie have had on the world
since its publication. The list covers a little over two pages and includes the existence of
the BYU student fight club, among many others; the “fight club look” of Versace; young
men burning kisses into their hand with lye; numerous parodies and imitations like SNL’s
“Fight Like a Girl Club” and The Onion’s “The Quilting Society”; Fight Club-inspired
Graffiti; commercial products that quote or name Tyler Durden on their packaging; and
more (110-12). In a sense, Palahniuk is mythologizing his own novel by enumerating its
permeating effect on society. But even after Palahniuk acknowledges the fact that people
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have been encouraged by the fight club phenomenon to hurt themselves and others, he
does nothing to condemn the extent to which people have been influenced by the novel.
In fact, in a 2006 USA Today article about underground teen fight clubs, Palahniuk, who
declined a formal interview said, “God bless these kids. I hope they’re having a great
time. I don’t think they’d be doing it if they weren’t having a great time” (M. McCarthy
par.12). Further eschewing any responsibility for his role in the novel’s followers’
destructive acts, he states “Once, a friend worried that these stories might prompt people
to copycat, and I insisted that we were just blue-collar nobodies living in Oregon with
public educations. There was nothing we could imagine that a million people weren’t
already doing” (215). This is all interesting because, at the same time that Palahniuk is
championing a philosophy where men break from the scene to become agents by
choosing to act and take responsibility for their actions, when it comes to taking
responsibility for the influence his novel has had, his response is to place himself under
the control of a larger scene, saying that he was just part of the motion, not part of the
action. This denial of responsibility, for me, indicates that the novel is not really some
type of carefully crafted masculine manifesto that Palahniuk, and the novel’s devoted
fans, would make it out to be. But, rather, it is a simple glorification of violence that
serves to play out the author’s and readers’ own violent fantasies.
All in all, Fight Club’s stated message is muddled at best, and the rhetorical
stance of the novel seems to encourage—or at the very least be indifferent to—traumatic
repetition of the events depicted and the philosophy that it espouses. However, that does
not mean that Fight Club is not a useful text. It still serves as an interesting and useful
study in the way that those who perpetuate violence might hide behind contrived
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philosophies to validate their own fantasies. In this case, looking at Fight Club gives us
an understanding of how dramatistic analysis can uncover motive within a text, and, by
examining the way that that motive is assigned within the text, the overall ideological
message and context of the violence in the novel. Once we can understand that
framework, we can determine the possible traumatic impact of the novel on the audience.
Such analysis reveals that Fight Club might be a socially dangerous book if its underlying
ideological contradictions and rhetorical structures are not taken into account or
understood. But despite the fact that Fight Club perpetuates violence and self-destruction,
what is more dangerous is the idea that all books that are violent on the surface should be
dismissed as gratuitous and socially irresponsible. In the end, Fight Club offers a glimpse
into what makes a violent piece of art dangerous, which, in and of itself, is valuable
knowledge that can be used as a benchmark for comparative study of other works that
might be dismissed for superficial violence14.

14

Examples of other texts banned for use of violence are A Clockwork Orange,
Slaughter-house Five, Catch 22, and others.

Gunter 63
CHAPTER 4: THE EVENING TRAUMA IN THE WEST:
THE RHETORIC OF VIOLENCE IN BLOOD MERIDIAN
For the past few years there have been rumors that Cormac McCarthy’s Blood
Meridian would be made into a movie, reflecting a strange desire in our culture to
appropriate any significant literary work (or any popular novel, TV show, comic strip,
graphic novel, ancient myth, cartoon, board game, etc.) and turn it into a film. And
although Blood Meridian is not the most publicly well-known of McCarthy’s novels, a
2006 New York Times Book Review article about the most important American fiction
of the past twenty years ranked Blood Meridian second after Toni Morrison’s Beloved
(Scott 17–19). And in literary circles it is widely accepted as McCarthy’s greatest work to
date. Director Ridley Scott, who has been vaguely connected to the project, gave an
interview to Cinematic Happenings Under Development, confirming that a Blood
Meridian movie was, indeed, in the works, but he expressed the difficulty of adapting
such a book to the screen because “You need violence to do it properly” (Smith par.33)15.
A New York Magazine article found Scott’s seemingly obvious observation laughable:
Blood Meridian is a book made up of almost nothing but violence.
Violence is its medium. Saying you need violence to do a film of it
properly is like saying you need paint to paint a picture properly. If [the
movie] ever happens, Blood Meridian might be the best movie in years
that we simply don't have the stomach to sit all the way through. (“Will
Ridley Scott” par. 3)
15

In this section of the interview, Scott comments that Blood Meridian would have to be
a big-budget movie in order to do it justice, insinuating that a large budget may not be
available for such a violent—assuredly R-rated—movie which may not make as much
money as a tamer PG-13 version.
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Indeed, Blood Meridian is McCarthy’s most violent work, but that is partly because of its
subject matter. Blood Meridian chronicles the rampage of a band of outlaws across the
American west in the 1840s. It follows their bloody massacre as they kill Indians for
profit and Mexicans for fun, eventually just killing everything that comes across their
path. And to the extent that McCarthy has created an historical novel, his depiction of the
American West contradicts popular, romantic myths of American cowboys and westward
expansion.
Richard Slotkin, in Regeneration Through Violence, observes that although there
was a conscious effort by early Americans to create an American mythology from the
ground floor, these attempts did “not take into account [. . .] that the process of
mythogenesis in a culture is one of continuous activity rather than dramatic starts and
stops. True myths are generated on a sub-literary level by the historical experience of a
people” (4). That is, American founding myths were, to some extent, fiction from the
beginning—conscious efforts at creating identity through different rhetorical
approaches—and were not created by an individual but by a continuous cultural process.
McCarthy’s book, then, represents one of those processes that attempts to revise earlier
myths, in turn revising American identity. But, despite its function as a revision of the
foundations of American identity one cannot help but wonder if its ultimate purpose
outweighs the massive amount of violence it contains. In functioning as a way to question
American identity, does Blood Meridian’s violence traumatize the reader to the point that
any useful rhetorical purpose is frustrated? The answer is complicated, but although
Blood Meridian is soaked with relentless violence, its rhetorical presentation of violence
resists a vicarious traumatic reading, leaning toward an observational, or virtual, reading
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that distances the reader from the action, maximizing traumatic impact without
encouraging mimetic acts.
Featuring the “Agent”
Much of my discussion of Fight Club centered around the paradox of competing
ideologies based in scene:act and act:agent ratios and how violence was the agency that
allowed agents to transcend their current situation. These same dynamics are at play in
Blood Meridian, but this discussion is concerned primarily with the term “agent” and
how responsibility for action is placed (or not placed) on the agent. Emphasizing
motivation in the agent, gives the agent responsibility for his or her actions, and an
ideology of individual responsibility for action encourages social change through
personal empowerment, whereas a doctrine that emphasizes scene as motive for action
effectively does not hold individuals responsible for their actions and fosters social
stagnation. As well, eschewing responsibility for individual action allows for the
manipulation of the individual by those in power. This is not to say that scene has no
effect on the agent and his personal empowerment. Indeed, the scene (as well as the other
pentadic terms) has a profound effect on the amount of power an agent has over his or her
own situation, limiting choices and setting standards and boundaries. However, without
the emphasis of power and responsibility being placed on the agent, the agent becomes an
agent of the scene, or a piece of the scenery to be manipulated by outside forces. It is this
focus on the motivational emphasis placed on the agent that is at the heart of the
conflicting ideologies at work in Blood Meridian.
The Kid
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The conflict of motivational emphases in Blood Meridian is illustrated in the
novel’s characterization of the kid and the judge. The kid is described as one who “can
neither read nor write and in him broods already the taste for mindless violence” (C.
McCarthy 3). And referring to the boy’s face, the author16 writes that there was “all
history present in that visage, the child the father of the man” (3). Both descriptions seem
to reduce the kid to a product of his surroundings: being born with an inherent taste for
violence that is otherwise unexplainable and being just another representation of the
succession of mankind. The feeling of fate pressing down on the kid is heightened by the
author’s use of the present tense. He writes, “He has a sister in this world that he will not
see again [. . . .] At fourteen he runs away. He will not see again the freezing
kitchenhouse in the predawn dark” (3-4 emphasis added). This use of present tense
though the first few pages makes the reader aware of authorial control over the kid,
explicitly letting the reader know that the author is in control, knows what is going to
happen, how everything is going to turn out. The sense that the author is the one
controlling the action and fate of this character seems to make the kid an unwitting pawn
in the world that has been created for him, taking away his control over his own actions.
In this way, the scene comes to be equated with motion17. Defined this way, the kid is
part of the motion of the novel, his actions being dictated by the story’s forward
16

Briefly, let me interject that the use of term “author” and its derivatives in the context
of this chapter does not imply McCarthy himself, but rather the implied author of the
story. I debated using the term “narrator,” but “narrator” only implies the teller and not
necessarily the creator of the story. In the last chapter, “narrator” worked well because it
was a reference to a character in the novel; however, here there is no narrating character,
so “author” seemed to better convey the ideas I am trying to get across.
17
As in the last chapter, I am using the term “motion” as Burke uses it, to connote the
physical, “subverbal,” or “extraverbal,” realm of actions that are done without thinking or
by instinct. See “Linguistic Approach to Problems in Education” (260-61), full citation in
Works Cited.
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momentum. Of course, making the kid part of the motion of the story also relieves the kid
of responsibility for his actions. So already the kid begins to represent an ideology that is
based in scene, where the scene defines and controls agents—a scene:agent ratio.
But despite this initial characterization, the kid attempts to assert his agent-ness18
early in the novel, although he fails and falls back into the motion of the scene. His
assertion comes when he is in the town of Nacogdoches. It has been raining for sixteen
days, and all the dirt streets have turned to mud, and, as a result, the town has set up
planks to walk on between buildings so that people don’t have to walk in the mud.
Walking on these planks, the kid comes face to face with another man, by the name of
Toadvine, who tells him to “get out of my way” (9), effectively commanding the kid to
step off the plank into the mud. However, “The kid wasn’t going to do that and he saw no
use in discussing it. He kicked the man in the jaw” (9). In this act, the kid, attempts to
assert his agent-ness over the scene by breaking the motion around him and standing out.
A fight ensues wherein both parties are injured. After this incident, the kid and Toadvine
become partners in crime. But true to his initial characterization, the kid slips into a
subservient role again, taking Toadvine’s commands.
The criminals separate shortly after a violent act they commit together, and the
kid leaves the town of Nacogdoches. After the kid leaves Toadvine, the narration slips
back into present tense, again emphasizing the author’s role over the kid’s destiny,
situating the kid firmly as an agent of the scene. From this point, the kid goes through a
series of incidents and chance happening where he never takes the role of an agent, but
18

I use the term “agent-ness” here and throughout the chapter to connote a will and
ability to act. In popular terms, it is the equivalent of “agency.” But because “agency” has
a very specific and different meaning when talking about the pentad, I have opted to use
this new term so as not to equivocate and confuse the reader.
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tends to wander, only reacting (not acting) to the scene around him. When asked by the
soldier of a renegade captain of the US Army if he wants to join with them to hunt
Indians and take over part of Mexico, the kid replies “I don’t know . . . the boy pulled at
the halms of grass. He looked at the horse again, Well, he said. Don’t reckon it’d hurt
nothin” (30). And after a discussion with the renegade army captain, where the kid offers
little more than ambiguous answers about his intentions or desires—or even any type of
affirmation that he wants to join the renegade army unit—the captain turns to his sergeant
and says “sign this man up” (36). Again, the pattern of giving up his own agent-ness and
responsibility is played out, making the kid nothing more than part of the motion, a prop
in the scene that other agents manipulate.
The kid eventually meets up with the judge and the Glanton gang, a group of
scalp hunters who are hired by the Mexican government to kill Indians and paid by the
scalp. He joins them in their bloody quest, and, soon after, largely disappears from the
narrative as the Glanton gang, led by Judge Holden (simply referred to in the story as
“the judge”), begins to dominate the action of the novel. In the way that the kid drops out
of the narrative for the majority of the novel, the novel’s form reflects the way that he
places dramatistic emphasis on scene. As it is, the kid, who emphasizes scene and doesn’t
take responsibility for his actions, disappears from the action (blending into the scene-ery
of the novel) as stronger actors take over the agent role (i.e. the judge).
Even when the kid emerges again at the end of the novel, he doesn’t appear to
have changed his ideology at all. At the end of the novel, when the kid is a man, he
shoots a boy in self-defense. “He wouldn’t have lived anyway,” he says (322). When the
boy's friends come to get they body, they agree: “I knowed we’d bury him on this prairie”
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(323). Another of the boys gives the reasoning behind this statement. Speaking of the
dead boy he says, “His momma and daddy both dead. His grandaddy was killed by a
lunatic and buried in the woods like a dog. He’s never knowed good fortune in his life
and now he aint got a soul in this world” (323). The kid says nothing but watches the
boys carry their dead companion away. As such, the kid shot the boy because it was
inevitable, not because he was making a choice to do so. So one can see that the kid still
views himself not as free-acting agent, but as part of the motion of the scene, only
carrying out what the situation dictates, and continues not to take responsibility for his
actions, illustrating his emphasis on a scene:agent ratio.
The Judge
When the kid first enters Nacodoches the narration quickly switches from present
to past tense, which is significant because this is where the kid first encounters the other
main character, the judge. At this meeting, the kid finds himself part of a crowd (another
scene) gathered in a tent to listen to a preacher (agent). The judge enters as part of the
crowd, but then sets himself apart from the motion of the scene by accusing the preacher
of being a con-artist, guilty of sexual deviancy. In doing so, the judge breaks from the
motion by acting to manipulate the scene around him. From that point, the judge
orchestrates a rebellion against the preacher to the point where they rise up and grab the
preacher to hang him. Minutes later, the kid enters a hotel lobby where the judge is
standing at the bar. Men around the judge ask him how he came to know the criminal past
of the reverend and the judge replies, “I never laid eyes upon the man before today.
Never even heard of him” (8). The author writes, “There was a strange silence in the
room. The men looked like mud effigies. Finally someone began to laugh. Then another.
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Soon they were all laughing together. Some one bought the judge a drink” (8). The judge,
from this characterization, is one who transcends scene through action; the judge openly
defies the motion of the scene to set himself apart by inciting action. So unlike the kid,
the judge is one who manipulates scene by differentiating himself from the motion
inherent in it, symbolizing an agent:scene ratio.
The judge’s motivational emphasis on the agent is seen specifically when he
explains his philosophy of cataloging the things he encounters. The judge has a book in
which he is constantly drawing and cataloging objects in the world, and, at one point, one
of the company of murderers tells him:
But don’t draw me, said Webster. For I don’t want in your book.
My book or some other book said the judge. What is to be deviates
no jot from the book wherein it’s writ. How could it? It would be a false
book and a false book is no book at all.
You’re a formidable riddler and I’ll not match words with ye. Save
my crusted mug from out your ledger there for I’d not have it shown about
perhaps to strangers.
The judge smiled. Whether in my book or not, every man is
tabernacled in every other and he in exchange and so on in an endless
complexity of being and witness to the uttermost edge of the world. (141)
Here, the judge recognizes the power of the scene, the way that history drives forward—
seemingly endlessly—without regard to individuals. But although the Judge recognizes
the power of the scene, he also recognizes his situatedness within it. The judge, then,
believes that by action (or inciting to action) he has the power to act as agent, controlling
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the scene around him. This is further illustrated when he discusses the ruins among which
the Glanton gang has made camp one night:
So. Here are the dead fathers. Their spirit is entombed in the stone. It lies
upon the land with the same weight and the same ubiquity. For whoever
makes a shelter out of reeds and hides has joined his spirit to the common
destiny of creatures and he will subside back into the primal mud with
scarcely a cry. But who builds in stone seeks to alter the structure of the
universe and so it was with these masons however primitive their works
may seem to us. (146)
The judge recognizes the scene in which he is performing (history has created the
moment in which he is currently participating), and thus he has the power to change “the
structure of the universe.” His philosophy is this: It is only through knowledge of the
scene that one can have power over it.
The judge’s power over the scene is even evident in the tone of the narrative at the
very end of the novel. After the judge kills the kid, the narrative returns to present tense;
however, the reemergence of the present tense at the end of the story seems different
from its use when the kid is first presented at the beginning of the novel. While
describing the kid, the author predicted the future and acted as the manipulator of the
narrative; whereas, at the end, the author states that the judge’s “feet are light and nimble.
He never sleeps. He says that he will never die. He dances in light and in shadow and he
is a great favorite. He never sleeps, the judge. He is dancing, dancing. He says that he
will never die” (335). Instead of simply stating that the judge will never die, the narrator
places motivational emphasis on the judge himself, “He says that he will never die.” As
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stated, the narrative recognizes the judge’s agent-ness by letting the judge take possession
of his words, effectively letting the judge become a co-agent with the author. In this way,
not only does the judge place power and responsibility in the agent, but the author
complies with that ideology, reflective of an agent:scene ratio.
Conflicting Ideologies
What the reader is faced with at the end of the novel is a conflict between the
ideological viewpoints of the scene:agent and agent:scene ratios, neither of which appears
appealing considering the way they are applied throughout the novel. But the conflict
becomes explicit as the kid runs into the judge at a saloon after the kid kills the boy on
the plains. The judge begins by dissecting the kid’s ideology: “Was it always your idea,
he said, that if you did not speak you would not be recognized?” (328). Here, the judge
recognizes the kid’s situation, wilfully embedded in the scene. Perhaps, it is here that we
gain the most insight about the kid. From the examples of the kid, expressed earlier, there
is a feeling that the kid does not realize his own situatedness, thus does not have the
power to act as an agent. But, the judge, who has observed the kid throughout their
murderous rampage across the American West, slaying indians, Mexicans, slaughtering
animals, and anything that stood in their path, recognizes that it is not just that the kid is
unaware of his situation, but also that the kid has willingly become part of the scenery in
order to eschew responsibility for his actions. That willful disregard for responsibility is
what the judge takes issue with.
At this point, the judge asserts there is a reason for all men being in the situations
they are in, even if they don’t realize it. The kid, then, turns to the other drunk and violent
saloon patrons, reasoning, “Everybody dont have to have a reason to be someplace”
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(328). In this statement, the kid weakly argues that most people are controlled by the
scene, having no reason for the things they do (just following the motions), relieving
others of responsibility for their actions. However, the kid does not recognize the
implications of his ideological stance. The judge counters him: “If it is so that they
themselves have no reason and yet are indeed here must they not be here by reason of
some other?” (328). The judge deconstructs the kid’s ideology and exposes to him the
reality of the kid’s own ideology—that the scene has control over those who do not
recognize its power. The judge continues,
This is an orchestration for an event. For a dance in fact. The participants
will be apprised of their roles at the proper time. For now it is enough that
they have arrived. As the dance is the thing with which we are concerned
and contains complete within itself its own arrangement and history and
finale there is no necessity that the dancers contain these things within
themselves as well. In any event the history of all is not the history of each
or indeed the sum of all those histories and none here can finally
comprehend the reason for his presence for he has no way of knowing
even in what the event consists. In fact, were he to know he might well
absent himself and you can see that that cannot be any part of the plan if
plan there be. (329)
The Burkian language in this excerpt is uncanny as the judge expounds on the power that
the scene has over those who do not recognize their own situation. From here, the judge
lays out his philosophy of gaining control of one’s situation and becoming an agent.
Speaking of the scene they are currently in as a “ritual,” he states:
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A ritual includes the letting of blood. Rituals which fail in this requirement
are but mock rituals […] We are not speaking in mysteries. You of all men
are no stranger to that feeling, the emptiness and the despair. It is that
which we take arms against, is it not? Is not blood the tempering agent in
the mortar which bonds? […] What do you think death is man? […] What
is death if not an agency? (329)
In this last line the judge identifies death as “an agency” or a means by which other
things are achieved. Coupled with the idea that rituals (representing scene) include a
blood letting (death) and that a ritual without a blood letting is false, death becomes an
agency by which men make their scene “real.” In the previous chapter, I discussed the
idea that violence is what sets you apart from consumer culture; the judge’s idea of the
“real” is similar but in a more general sense. In the sense that the judge is using it, “to
make real” does not mean to bring into being. He has already established that the scene
exists and has great power. Therefore “real” here means to bring into reality or to become
aware of. Hence, death is the tool by which men become aware of their situation within
the scene. The judge elucidates this idea later in his conversation with the kid:
As war becomes dishonored and its nobility called into question those
honorable men who recognize the sanctity of blood will be excluded from
the dance, which is the warrior’s right, and thereby will the dance become
a false dance and the dancers false dancers. And yet there will be one there
always who is a true dancer […] Only that man who has offered up
himself entire to the blood of war, who has been to the floor of the pit and
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seen horror in the round and learned at the last that it speaks to his inmost
heart, only that man can dance. (331)
So not only is death the tool by which men can come to recognize the scene, but the man
who has recognized his scene (as grisly as it might be in its power over history and
mankind) is the only “true dancer,” or the agent who becomes powerful and can control
his own dance, acting as a true agent by taking responsibility for action.
At this point, the judge’s philosophy seems to be completely irresponsible from a
social standpoint—he argues that killing others makes one powerful. However, even if
explicit killing takes place throughout the novel, it is not just the act of killing itself that
has brought the judge the power to be a “true dancer.” If this were the case, then the kid,
who has participated in all the same violence, would be just as powerful, but he is not.
The key to understanding the way that the judge views violence hearkens back to his
catalog of the world, the book that he carries in which he draws and catalogs things he
encounters. When asked what he intends to do with the sketches and notes in his ledger,
the judge replies, “expunge them from the memory of man” (140). His intention is to kill
these objects by identifying them. (The objects themselves are thrown into the fire and
destroyed, thus the judge asserts his power to control the scene, by killing part of the
scenery.) So, to the judge, killing and identification are the same act. Interestingly, Burke
identifies killing in the same way: “The killing of something is the changing of it, and the
statement of the thing’s nature before and after the change is an identifying of it” (Burke
Rhetoric 20). Thus, the judge’s philosophy is not one of simply killing, but one of gaining
power through identification. For it is in this form of identification that one takes on the
ultimate responsibility—the responsibility for life itself. But it is only by taking that
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responsibility upon one’s self that power is earned. And with that power, one becomes an
agent and “true dancer.”
The Dominant Ideology
Getting at the dominant ideology of the book, then, is tricky. Are we supposed to
pity the kid, to view him as a tragic figure caught up in circumstance? Or are we to enact
the judge’s moral-but-destructive philosophy of gaining power through death?
Ultimately, the text itself reveals its ideological preference through its rhetorical
presentation, or the attitudes it betrays toward the characters and situations it portrays.
Booth states that “all authors inevitably take sides” (Rhetoric 78), meaning that the
authors cannot help but be subjective in their attitude toward their own characters. In
Blood Meridian it is the kid that seems to be condemned for his ideology and actions (or
inactions). This is not only illustrated through the kid’s death at the hands of the judge,
but by his characterization as an illiterate (exemplified by his use of double negatives,
“aint,” and his general lack of self-awareness), as one who does not think about his
actions, as a coward, and ultimately by his lack of a name (simply given the epithet “the
kid,” connoting a naive, juvenile). Conversely, the judge is portrayed as cunning,
intelligent, and powerful. He speaks eloquently and philosophically. Even his title, “the
judge,” connotes power and authority. And even though not all eloquent characters are
heroes, the judge is also portrayed as the moral center of the book because he has adopted
an idealistic ideology that places responsibility for action on the agent, which, according
to Burke, is a moral stance19. So, although the judge is a mass murderer it is his ideology
that, rhetorically, is the most dominant and appealing.

19

See my discussion of Susie’s moral stance in chapter 2.
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But praising the judge for his idealistic philosophy seems gruesome and counterintuitive for any argument trying to make a case for the positive effects of such a
disturbingly violent book. However, just because the kid is condemned does not mean the
judge’s actions are glorified. For instance, when the judge is found by a band of Yumas
trying to kill the Glanton gang, the judge is described as follows: “When they entered the
judge’s quarters they found the idiot [a mentally disabled man the gang has picked up
along the way] and a girl of perhaps twelve years cowering naked on the floor. Behind
them also naked stood the judge” (275). Being caught naked with a twelve year-old girl
and a mentally disabled man is certainly not glorious. Or take, for instance, the judge’s
last impression on the reader: dancing naked in the saloon after killing the kid, the judge
is
Huge and pale and hairless, like an enormous infant. […] He bows to the
fiddlers and sashays backwards and throws back his head and laughs deep
in his throat […] He wafts his hat and the lunar dome of his skull passes
palely under the lamps and he swings about and takes possession of one of
the fiddles and he pirouettes and makes a pass, two passes, dancing and
fiddling at once. (335)
The judge is a grotesque, frightening, and unappealing figure, not the positive idealist one
might expect based on his moralist ideology. In this way, the narrator displays a judgment
on the application of the judge’s philosophy. Although the judge’s philosophy becomes
the dominant ideology of the book, the judge himself is also judged on his responsibility
for the knowledge he has, as the reader is repulsed by the judge and his actions and
cannot identify with him.
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Traumatic Impact
As evidenced in the last chapter, Fight Club has the power to encourage young
men toward self-destruction and violent behavior. Blood Meridian, being admittedly
much more violent, would logically lead to even more socially irresponsible behavior.
However, it does not. This may be due, partly, to the subject matter: Fight Club is about
men fighting modern consumer culture and Blood Meridian is about western outlaws—
it’s easy to form a fight club, but harder to go on a rampage through the southwestern
desert today. But, these differences seem superfluous, owing to the fact that Tyler Durden
and the judge adopt similar ideological perspectives of becoming an agent through
violence. As a result, both novels could incite similar mimetic acts. But despite these
similarities, the rhetoric of violence in Blood Meridian doesn’t encourage mimetic acts.
Blood Meridian is an extremely violent book, filled with disturbing imagery. For
example, there is the incident of the bush of dead babies:
They came to a bush that was hung with dead babies. [. . .] These small
victims, seven, eight of them, had holes punched in their underjaws and
were hung so by their throats from the broken stobs of a mesquite to stare
eyeless at the naked sky. (57)
And when the kid comes upon a town that has been massacred by a group of Cherokee,
he enters a nearby church to find that “the murdered lay in a great pool of their communal
blood. It had set up into a sort of pudding crossed everywhere with the tracks of wolves
or dogs and along the edges it had dried and cracked into a burgundy ceramic” (60). Soon
after, he meets up with the Glanton gang, whom are described in all their gruesome dress
and appearance: “The trappings of their horses fashioned out of human skin and their
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bridles woven up from human hair and decorated with human teeth and the riders
wearing scapulars or necklaces of dried and blackened human ears” (78). Or take the
simple acts of brutality that become commonplace throughout the novel. For example, the
judge buys a pair of puppies from a street vendor and throws them into a river:
The dogs disappeared in the foam. [. . .] The Vandiemenlander raised and
cocked his pistol. [. . .] The pistol bucked in his hand and one of the dogs
leaped in the water and he cocked it again and fired again and a pink stain
diffused. He cocked and fired the pistol a third time and the other dog also
blossomed and sank. (192-93)
Violent acts become so commonplace that cruel and random killings take on an feeling of
mundaneness, like the following passage: “Brown on his way back from the bar poured a
pitcher of aguardiente over a young soldier and set him afire with his cigar. The man ran
outside mute save for the whoosh of the flames” (268).
But despite the senseless violence in these acts and images, they are all presented
in a removed, third-person style that is shockingly stark, the way that a serial killer might
indifferently describe torturing victims, treating them as things, not people. This
presentation of events breaks from normal experience, much the same way that Brian
Evenson uses violence to “[overflow] boundaries of expectation” (271). However,
whereas Evenson’s violence is meant to make the reader a victim of the violence, Blood
Meridian’s violence makes the reader a bystander or witness to these atrocities. And it is
in this way that Blood Meridian does not invite the reader to participate in a vicarious
experience through the text. Instead, the novel creates a virtual experience that allows the
reader to witness horribly traumatic events without becoming a victim.
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In addition, the novel does not allow one to have a vicarious experience as a
killer. In Fight Club, the reader is encouraged to be drawn into the thinking and actions of
the narrator, identifying with him and experiencing the same traumas and perpetrating the
same violence. However, Blood Meridian does not allow for any identification
whatsoever with any of its characters. As discussed earlier, because of the kid’s
ideological perspective and the narrative’s attitude toward him, the kid is not a
sympathetic character—not someone with whom the reader can easily identify.
Additionally, the judge is grotesque. Even if his ideology is “moral” his actions are not,
resulting in the reader’s impression that the judge is not admirable but disgusting and
repulsive. As such, the reader cannot identify with the judge in any meaningful way
either. Because the reader cannot identify with either of the main characters, the reader
cannot have any type of vicarious experience with the text, experiencing it neither as a
victim nor as a perpetrator.
Blood Meridian, then, has an interesting dynamic at play: a maximizing of violent
content with no way for the reader to identify with the text either as a victim or
perpetrator. How does a reader deal with an experience that is both traumatic and virtual?
That is, if readers experience violence, but cannot identify with the characters involved in
the process, how does the reader experience a catharsis of the emotions involved?
Without catharsis there is no emotional resolve, which invites readers to work through the
traumatic experience themselves without the help of identification. But because the
experience is not vicarious but virtual, the working through is conceptual not actual. The
trauma inflicted on readers is, then, a trauma that invites contemplation not physical
aggression or the acting-out of traumatic symptoms. Within the context of Blood
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Meridian, if the novel is a revision of mythic western narratives, the violence in the book
leads one to contemplate the concept of their own identification as an American and what
that means in the context of a bloody westward expansion at the foundation of that
identity. So, in a sense, Blood Meridian is about the violence inherent in our concept of
ourselves, but does not invite repetition of that violence.
Identity and Social Benefit
Although Blood Meridian may contain extensive, bloody violence, the rhetoric of
the violence in the novel helps one to work through trauma in order to come to a better
understanding of self and identity within an American context. But do not take this
analysis to be an apologetic for Blood Meridian; the violence it contains is still disturbing
and many people are turned off by it. I, myself, give a disclaimer to anyone who seems
interested in reading it because I want to let them know that the content is extreme.
However, as a whole, the novel does have a useful—even beneficial—social function in
leading readers to question the role of violence that is inherent in their very selves and the
way they identify themselves in the context of history. Admittedly, it does so through
extreme imagery, but the social benefit would not occur without the content. As such,
Blood Meridian serves as a complex study in the way that the rhetoric of violence can
function in a novel and in society. And, hopefully, the type of analysis I have advocated
(pentadic analysis and trauma theory) will allow more readers to understand the dynamics
at play in Blood Meridian and not dangerously dismiss it categorically along with other
violent texts or media.
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CHAPTER 5: AFTERMATH:
DECODING VIOLENCE, REMAKING IDENTITY
On July 4th, 1990, while out for a mid-morning walk, Susan Brison was grabbed
from behind, raped, strangled, beaten, and left for dead. A professor of philosophy, she
tried to put the experience and the subsequent aftermath into some sort of context, to
make sense of the whole thing, but found she could not (ix). Her book Aftermath: The
Remaking of a Self chronicles her search for understanding and her thoughts on trauma
and violence. After the incident, she said she felt like she had died and that “the line
between life and death, once so clear and sustaining, now seemed carelessly drawn and
easily erased” (8-9). When trying to explain the attack to others she was met universally
with denial (9). It is not that people didn’t believe that she was raped and almost killed,
but that people tried to explain the rape in ways that made sense to them, placing blame,
trying to make the situation seem like it could have been prevented—sometimes
inadvertently blaming Brison for her own rape. She comments, “Where the facts would
appear to be incontrovertible, denial takes the shape of attempts to explain the assault in
ways that leave the observers’ worldview unscathed” (9). Brison reasons that this is
because some violence can be so traumatic that others “cannot allow themselves to
imagine the victim’s shattered life, or else their illusions about their own safety and
control over their own lives might begin to crumble” (9). The fact of the matter is that
trauma shatters self-identity; however, Brison argues that “it’s essential to try to convey
it” (5). LaCapra agrees with Brison, arguing that, for the victim, retelling, or narrating,
traumatic experience can help to separate the past event from the repetitive traumatic
symptoms they cause (128-29) which is important for victims to do if they want to come
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to terms with the trauma they have experienced (117-19)20. For this purpose, Brison
comments that narratives “can then be integrated into the survivor’s sense of self and
view of the world, but it also reintegrates the survivor into a community, reestablishing
bonds of trust and faith in others” (Brison xi), which is essential to creating a life after
trauma.
Notwithstanding the effect that narrating trauma has on victims, trauma is more
widely used for purposes other than a victim’s healing, specifically in the realm of violent
fiction. The fact that fictional violence acts rhetorically on an audience is not new. As
mentioned in chapter 1, violence has been used to create a rhetorical effect on readers for
political, social, and religious reasons. And these attempts go far beyond the few texts
that I have mentioned in this thesis and into other types of media. However, the use of
violence is not always as altruistic as bringing people to God, helping to define
masculinity, exploring race relations, or helping people to understand victims of rape. In
fact, violence is probably most often used simply for entertainment or shock value. The
danger of a flood of violent media is that inasmuch as it can break readers’ sense of
reality and identity, if repeated ad nauseum, it can also deaden the senses and feelings,
desensitizing readers toward violence and leading them to accept higher levels and
amounts of violent behavior.
Anderson, et al., in multiple studies on the effect of violent media on individuals,
argue that not only does watching violent media increase aggression in viewers, but that
20

LaCapra adds, “Working-through means work on posttraumatic symptoms in order to
mitigate the effects of trauma by generating counterforces to compulsive repetition (or
acting-out), thereby enabling a more viable articulation of affect and cognition or
representation, as well as ethical and sociopolitical agency, in the present and future.
Hence, as I am using the term, working-through does not mean total redemption of the
past or healing its traumatic wounds” (119).
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Repeated exposure to such [media] can lead the viewer to experience less
of a negative emotional reaction to future scenes of blood and gore and to
pain expressed by victims. Such habituation (or desensitization) may well
enable one to consider harming someone without experiencing the
negative emotional reactions that normally inhibit aggression. (99)
For example, on September 11th, 2001, I was working when I heard about the first plane
to hit the World Trade Center. My coworkers and I turned on the TV and watched as the
towers’ gaping hole spewed black smoke. Like everyone else, I didn’t know what was
going on and was generally confused. When the second plane hit, I saw the explosion it
created and my first reaction was excitement. Immediately after experiencing that sense
of excitement, I realized that the pictures on the television were not part of a Bruce Willis
movie—it was not directed by Michael Bay or produced by Jerry Bruckheimer. Real
people had just died in a large ball of fire. The thought was strange because I had been
used to applauding such acts of violence in the movies and on TV. And I realized then
that I was a product of desensitization, simply by exposing myself to violent media—and
not extremely gory, media at that, but just “ordinary,” “harmless,” “entertaining,” “runof-the-mill” action movies.
But despite the desensitization that violence can cause, the rhetoric of violence
can also create social awareness or lead to political change. Take, for example, Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle whose graphic depictions of the meat packing industry caused the
creation of legislation protecting meat packing workers and consumers. Or look at Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin whose violence spurred the anti-slavery movement
along toward the Civil War. Even Ott and Aoki, who assert that the coverage of the
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beating death of Matthew Shepherd did not bring about real social change, acknowledge
that anti-hate crime legislation was widely discussed—and enacted in some states—in
reaction to the media coverage of the event and subsequent conviction of the perpetrators
(228, 231-32). As a result, although violence is destructive and can encourage aggression,
it can also be a force for positive social change.
So, if violence is destructive, but can also be socially useful, the solution to
narrative violence cannot be to ban all depictions of violence. The solution to this
problem is a better understanding of how the rhetoric of violence works on audiences so
that audiences can take a closer look at the elements of violent media they see around
them and understand the effects it might be having on them. What I have attempted to do
throughout this thesis is to suggest that the social impact of violence does not come from
a surface level of understanding, but rather comes from an analysis of the ideologies at
play in the text. Again, Anderson, et al., have found that various presentations of violence
to an audience can have various effects on the amount of aggressiveness they display
after watching it (98). For example, whether an audience identifies with the aggressor or
the victim, or whether the aggressor seems justified or is punished for his or her actions,
have all proven to have an effect on the audience’s attitude toward future confrontation
and aggressive behavior (98-99). Ultimately, violent acts occur within the particular
context of an individual text, each of which has its own ideological framework—whether
the author of the text expresses a particular ideology or not. An understanding of the
ideologies at play within each text, then, should help one to determine the context within
which violent acts occur, for what reasons it occurs, and the possible rhetorical impact of
that violence as interpreted by the reader. As has been shown, Burke’s model of
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dramatism works very well for understanding the ideologies at play within a text. Using
pentadic analysis, then, we can identify the ideological viewpoint of the text itself, which
can help us determine the context of the violence and any rhetorical effects it might have.
Although good rhetorical analysis that takes into account the expressed (or
uncovers the unexpressed) ideology of the text might be good for examining all types of
texts, both written and otherwise, in the case of violent texts—or those that use violence
specifically as a rhetorical tool—examining the ideologies at work is essential to
understanding how the violence functions within the text and on audiences. Because
violence is a powerful tool that can create guilt, place blame, incur secondary traumatic
symptoms, create understanding, and simply shock, examining the ideological framework
within which it is embedded gives us an understanding of how that violence can or
should be perceived, and thus an insight into the way that it might function toward social,
personal, or political ends. But basic rhetorical analysis (and, in the case of this thesis,
pentadic analysis) does not have the vocabulary or a theoretical model to deal with the
social effects of violence specifically. Trauma studies, on the other hand, provides rich
vocabulary and concepts (like vicarious and virtual trauma) for dealing with questions
concerning the use of violence for purposes of inflicting trauma on the reader or
audience. At the same time, trauma studies lacks a solid model of textual analysis that
can deal specifically with the nature of printed text and their rhetorical effects. As such,
trauma studies needs rhetorical analysis—specifically a mode that examines ideology,
such as Burke’s pentad—and rhetorical analysis coupled with trauma studies can produce
a reading that explores the ways in which violence functions ideologically leading to
possible rhetorical effects as well as its social usefulness. Pairing Burke’s pentad and
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trauma studies, then, can serve as a powerful tool for understanding the possible personal
and social impact of violent texts.
But despite the theories and analyses I have laid out in this paper, I hope that
these ideas can go beyond a simple textual (and contextual) analysis of fiction. By
studying the way that violence works rhetorically, I hope that we can come to a better
understanding of how violence affects social interaction and political policy. The fact is,
discussing violence in novels and movies is an fascinating intellectual and scholarly
pursuit, but the rhetoric of violence is used in many other ways that could potentially
affect us both physically and socially on a larger scale: Jihadist websites use video
depictions of violence to inspire and recruit more members to their cause; US soldiers
create home videos of daily violence in Iraq, both to show others the brutality of the war
and to inspire patriotism in other soldiers; street gangs use acts of violence rhetorically to
send messages to other gangs; anti-abortion literature uses the rhetoric of violence to
encourage support for their cause; the threat of violence in home security system
commercials is used to create a desire to buy home security systems; even children’s
superhero cartoons can preach violence as a first line of defense against any combatants;
and the rhetoric of a rape narrative acts to change our sympathies toward victims of rape.
Susan Sontag, the noted photographer and essayist, observes that photographs
depicting violence, hunger, and other stark images “cannot create a moral position, but
they can reinforce one—and can help build a nascent one” (17). However, she goes on:
The quality of feeling, including moral outrage, that people can muster in
response to photographs of the oppressed, the exploited, the starving, and
the massacred also depends on the degree of their familiarity with these
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images. [. . .] Photographs shock insofar as they show something novel.
Unfortunately, the ante keeps getting raised—partly through the
proliferation of such images of horror. (19)
The problem is a paradox, images of violence can be used to arouse feeling and spur
people toward political action, yet the more these images pervade our consciousness, the
more likely we are to ignore them. In reluctance, Sontag adds, “photography has done at
least as much to deaden experience as to arouse it” (21). The same might be said of
violence in all forms of media: the more we experience narrative trauma, either
vicariously or virtually, the ante is raised on the amount of trauma we can deal with. As
society becomes more immersed in narratives of violence, physical reaction to the actual
violence around us becomes deadened. And deadening our reaction to violence leads to a
callousness toward victims and an acceptance of those who perpetrate violence. What I
hope is that by studying the rhetoric of violence in texts that may have a relatively small
impact on society at large, we might come to understand how the rhetorical use of
violence might function on a larger scale, so that we may use it, or discourage its use, in
ways that will actually have an impact on social and political interaction at a community,
national, or international scale.
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